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FOLLOWING INDUSTRY'S LEED®: MUNICIPAL ADOPTION OF 

PRIVATE GREEN BUILDING STANDARDS 

Sarah B. Schindler* 
Abstract 
Local governments are beginning to require new, privately constructed 
and funded buildings to be "green" buildings. Instead ofcreating their own, 
locally-derived definitions of green buildings, many municipalities are 
adopting an existing private standard created by members of the building 
industry: LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design). This 
Article explains and assesses the privately promulgated LEED standards. It 
argues that the translation of LEED standards, which were intended to be 
voluntary, into law raises several theoretical and practical problems. 
Specifically, private green building ordinances that rely on LEED do not 
ensure a reduction in the negative local environmental impacts of 
buildings, nor do they provide any assurance that those standards were 
created through a legitimate process. The Article concludes by offering an 
alternative approach, suggesting that municipalities should instead enact 
green building ordinances that have been promulgated by public 
governmental bodies, rather than private, industry-based organizations, and 
done so locally, taking into account specific local building-related and 
environmental concerns. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: AN EMERGING TREND IN MUNICIPAL LAW 
An old building with poor insulation and dripping faucets sits in the 
middle of a busy, traditional downtown. It is close to a number of city bus 
routes and an underground subway stop. It has no parking lot or structure 
associated with it, and it is a short walk from a large city park. Across the 
county, a brand-new energy-efficient commercial building has just been 
constructed in the middle of a recently rezoned former plot of farmland. It 
has a green roof1 and its large covered parking lot boasts a number of solar 
panels. The nearest homes and stores are ten miles away, connected to this 
new building by recently constructed roads and other infrastructure. Which 
is the "greener" building?2 And more importantly, who should make that 
decision? 
Despite the impacts that buildings have on local, regional, and even 
global ecosystems, governments have traditionally given surprisingly little 
consideration to the way that buildings and building practices affect the 
1. A green roof (also called a vegetated or living roof) is a roof covered with soil, vegetation, 
and drainage mechanisms. 
2. Green building has been defined as that which "relates to a facility's design, construction, 
operation, or renovation, in which the waste generated is disposed of in an ecologically sound 
manner." Nancy J. King & Brian J. King, Creating Incentives for Sustainable Buildings: A 
Comparative Law Approach Featuring the United States and the European Union, 23 VA. ENVlL 
L.J. 397 , 404 (2005); see also Charles J. Kibert, Green Buildings: An Overview ofProgress, 19 J. 
LAND USE & ENV1L. L. 491, 491-92 (2004) ("[F]acilities designed, built, operated, renovated, and 
disposed of using ecological principles for the purpose ofpromoting occupant health and resource 
efficiency plus minimizing the impacts of the built enviromnent on the natural environment."). 
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environment. That oversight is unfortunate because their environmental 
effects are dramatic. Construction and demolition waste make up 
approximately one-third of all landfilled materials? Stormwater runoff 
from roofs containing asbestos degrades local stream and river quality, as 
does erosion and sediment from building construction practices. Buildings 
and infrastructure contain up to 90% of all materials that have ever been 
extracted from the environment,4 and in the United States, buildings 
consume nearly 40% of all primary energy.5 On an even broader scale, 
building construction activities and the energy used to operate those 
buildings contribute more than any other source to man-made carbon 
dioxide production, and thus to climate change. 6 
Designing regulations to address sweeping environmental problems 
such as climate change has not been easy nor, thus far, very successful. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that a global regulatory solution is needed 
to successfully address a global environmental problem such as climate 
change.7 However, a true global solution has yet to emerge. Governments 
at the state and federal levels have attempted to reach consensus around 
ideas for broad climate change legislation, with little success. 8 The focus 
3. U.S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, CHARACTFRIZATION OFBUILDING-RElA1ED CONSTRUCTION 
AND DEMOUTION DEBRIS IN Tiffi UNITED STATES 3 -1 (1998), available at 
http:/ /p2pays. org/ref/02/0 1095. pdf. 
4. Kibert, supra note 2, at 493. 
5. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABlE ENERGY , 2008 BUilDINGS 
ENERGY DATA BooK 1-3 (2008), available at http ://buildingsdatabook.eren. doe.gov/docs/DataB 
ooks12008_BEDB.pdf [hereinafter 2008 BUILDINGS ENERGY DATA BooK); U.S. DEP'TOFENERGY, 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REviEW 2003, DOE/EIA-0384 36 (2003), available at 
http:/ /tonto. eia. doe. gov/FfPROOT/multifuel/038403. pdf; Charles J. Kibert, Policy Instruments for 
a Sustainable Built Environment, 17 J. LAND UsE& ENVTLL 379, 379, 381 (2002). 
6. 2008 BUilDINGS ENERGY DATA BOOK, supra note 5, at 1-30; see alsoTHEMAYOR'STASK 
FORCE ON GREEN BUilDING FOR Tiffi CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (2007), available at http: //www.sfenvironment.org/downloads/library/gbt 
frrreleasev 1.3. pdf [hereinafter MAYOR' STASK FORCE REPORT, SAN FRANCISCO] ("As the City looks 
at a broad range of policies and programs to improve sustainability, it recognizes that buildings are 
the number one contributor to man-made CO! production (greater than transportation and industrial 
sources), and have significant impacts on air quality, landfill , transportation, energy consumption, 
resource use, and occupant health and productivity."). 
7. Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R Saleska, Sub global Regulation ofthe Global Commons: The 
Case ofClimate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 187 ( 2005). 
8. Although the landscape in this area is rapidly changing, a number of federal climate 
change bills have been proposed but failed to pass. For example, the Lieberman-McCain Climate 
Stewardship Act was brought before the Senate in 2003 as a bipartisan effort toward a nationwide 
climate change policy. Lieberman-McCain Climate Stewardship Act, S. 139, 1 08th Cong. (2003). 
Among other things, the Act would have required the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency to implement regulations that would limit the amount of greenhouse gas 
emissions from various sectors of the economy (accountable for approximately 85% of U.S. 
emissions in the year 2000), with the goal of capping the 2010 aggregate emissions level at the 2000 
level. /d. § 316; see Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Summary of the Lieberman-McCain 
Climate Stewardship Act, http: //www. pewclimate. org/policy _center/analyses/s_l3 9 _summary. cfm 
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has thus shifted to how environmental impacts can be addressed at more 
discrete levels, such as by regulating buildings. 
In recent years, a uniform, nationally promulgated private regulatory 
scheme has be%un taking hold: Leadership in Energy and Environmental 
Design (LEED") green building standards, developed by the United States 
Green Building Council (USGBC). Many of the early adopters of this 
privately created regulatory scheme have been municipalities.9 Because 
local governments are typically responsible for issuing discretionary 
permits for the construction of new buildings, they are easily able to 
require additional regulation of private development projects. 10 By 
imposing green building requirements on private developers, local 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (summarizing bill). Even after a revised version was proposed to amend 
the original bill, it still failed by a vote of 43 to 55. Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 108th 
Proposals in Detail (l ), http: //www. pewclimate. org/what_s_being_done/in_ the_congress/1 08th 
v2.cfm#emissionlimits (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). Similarly, a 2008 attempt at federal climate 
change policy, the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act, also failed after being debated. 
Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, llOth Cong. (2008); see also Eric 
Pooley, Why the Climate Bill Failed, TIME, June 9, 2008, available at 
http: //www. time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599, 1812836,00.html (discussing the Lieberman­
Warner Climate Security Act's failure to pass). States are not immune to the problems in passing 
climate change legislation. Indeed, California, often thought to be on the more liberal and 
progressive end of environmental issues, has recently seen several bills aimed at environmental 
protection fail as a result of Governor Schwarzenegger's veto power. See Press Release, Natural 
Res. Def. Council, A Mixed Finish for 2008 Environmental Bills in California, Says NRDC (Oct. 
10, 2008), available at http: //www.nrdc.org/media/2008/081010.asp (listing signed and vetoed 
environmental bills in California in 2008 and highlighting Governor Schwarzenegger' s veto of SB 
974, which would have substantially helped reduce air pollution produced by California's ports). 
9. See, e.g., Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (DSIRE), Texas 
Incentives/Policies for Renewables and Efficiency, Austin-Green Building Requirement for City 
Projects, http ://www. dsireusa. org/library /includeslincentive2. cfm?Incentive_Code=TX14R&O.Ir 
rentPageiD=l&RE=l&EE=l (last visited Jan. 24, 2010) (providing information on June 2000 
adoption of LEED standards in Austin, Texas); SANTAMONICACITY STAFF, REPoRTTOMAYORAND 
CITY COUNCILRECOMMENDING APPROVAL OFGREEN BUILDING GRANT PROGRAMAND INNOVATIVE 
TECHNOLOGY GRANTPROGRAM (2004 ), available at http ://wwwOl.smgov.net/cityclerklcouncil/agen 
das/2004/20040113/ s2004011308-B.htm (providing history of Santa Monica Green Building 
incentives and noting that "the City Council adopted a policy effective July 1, 2001, that requires all 
new construction and major renovations ofCity facilities to meet the Silver level ofLEED wherever 
feasible"); City of Seattle Dep't of Planning & Dev., City Green Building: Seattle's Policy & 
Progress, http :1/www. cityofseattle. net/dpd/GreenB uilding/CapitalProjectsl SeattlesPolicy Idefault. asp 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2010) (noting Seattle's 2000 adoption of a Sustainable Building Policy, which 
requires LEED silver certification for all new city-funded projects and certain renovations; 
providing link to text of policy). In the United States, local governments have typically regulated 
public land use. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROL: CASES AND 
MATERIALS34 (2d ed. 2000). There are multiple forms oflocal governments that engage in land use 
regulations, including counties, municipalities, towns, townships, and special districts. !d. Although 
each form is distinct, throughout this Article for ease of readability, the terms for the different local 
governmental units will be used interchangeably. 
10. This is still a nascent trend, though one that is growing. Many of the ordinances that have 
been adopted have not yet gone into effect. 
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governments are attempting to limit local environmental externalities 
created by building construction and operation. The climate change 
benefits of those buildings are a bonus that piggybacks onto local benefits. 
While the encouragement of green buildings at the local level is 
certainly a step in the right direction toward lessening the negative 
environmental impacts of buildings, ordinances that force private 
developers to comply with uniform standards developed by a private 
building-industry organization are fraught with practical and legal 
problems that have not been fully explored in scholarly literature. 11 This 
Article analyzes from a normative and legal perspective this emerging 
green building regulatory regime. It cautions against local requirements 
that force private developers to comply with nationally promulgated, 
private, voluntary LEED standards as opposed to publicly created local 
ones. 
At the most general level, this Article is concerned with the fact that 
municipalities are allowing unelected members of a private, industry­
centered organization to promulgate-and in some cases enforce­
standards that restrict what a property owner may do with her property and 
hinder the community's ability to ensure the healthiest possible 
environment. Incorporating such private regulations into the law fails to 
achieve what should be the two fundamental goals ofa new green building 
regime: (1) efficacy and (2) legitimate process. This Article uses "efficacy" 
to mean that a green building regime should cost-effectively ensure that 
green building measures are strong enough to reduce key local 
11. At this point, most legal commentators have simply stated that incorporating standards, 
such as the LEED standards, into building and planning codes is not a good idea, without offering 
detailed discussions as to why. See Carl J. Circo, Using Mandates and Incentives to Promote 
Sustainable Construction and Green Building Projects in the Private Sector: A Call for More State 
Land Use Policy Initiatives, 112 PENN ST. L. REv. 731, 747 (2008) ("Standards of this nature [such 
as LEED] are not good candidates to incorporate into building codes or other mandatory regulations 
and are best left to voluntary industry initiatives."); Benjamin S. Kingsley, Note, Making it Easy to 
Be Green: Using Impact Fees to Encourage Green Building, 83 N.Y. U. L. REv. 532, 548 (2008) 
("Despite the clear effectiveness of building requirements, however, an abundance of literature 
suggests that such requirements have negative effects on development."). While these concerns 
have by and large been ignored by academic and legal commentators, some state and local 
government players have noted their concerns. See, e.g. , Dan Walters, Private Law Undercuts 
Democracy , SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 6, 2007 , atA3, available at 2007 WLNR 15102662 ("By all 
accounts, USGBC [(the entity that promulgates the LEED standards)) is a legitimate organization 
that acts as a forum for agreements on environmentally friendly building standards. But it's not the 
only organization doing that work. At any rate, the standards it decrees and the methods it uses to 
draft those decrees are matters of its internal politics-including influence from those who support 
it financially-and are shielded from input by the outside world. Under [a proposed state Green 
Building bill], California taxpayers would be on the hook for whatever standards USGBC 
developed by whatever process it uses. Were this an isolated case, it might merit a pass, but it's part 
of a broader legislative tendency to avoid tough policy decisions by shifting them to unaccountable 
outside organizations."). 
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environmental externalities caused by buildings. 12 This Article uses 
"legitimate process" to mean the regime should ensure that the regulations 
implemented by local governments are subject to a promulgation and 
enforcement process that contains elements of transparency, democracy, 
and openness to public participation or that provides notice and an 
opportunity for voice and exit. 13 Although any action that in fact lessens 
the environmental harm caused by building practices and operation 
represents a good first step, the goals of efficacy and legitimate process 
will not be met if cities continue to rely on privately developed LEED 
standards as the centerpiece of their green building regulations. 
Part II of this Article analyzes issues of scale and considers whether 
green building requirements should be imposed at a local, national, or 
international level. One purpose of green building ordinances is to reduce 
the harmful effects of global warming. 14 
Because climate change is a global problem, many commentators 
contend that it must be addressed at an international or transnational level. 
While there is some merit to this claim from a policy perspective, buildings 
do not only contribute to the global climate change problem, but also result 
in numerous local externalities and environmental harms, such as water 
and energy over-consumption, poor river quality due to erosion and 
sedimentation, and degraded indoor and outdoor air quality. These local 
problems, which vary from region to region, are best addressed at a local 
level, from both an efficacy and legitimate process standpoint. Moreover, 
local governments have already begun to take action by enacting private 
green building mandates in the face of inaction at the national and 
international level. 
Part III presents a descriptive analysis of LEED's role in furthering 
green building practices and its recent co-option by municipalities. This 
Part begins by providing background on LEED green building standards. 
Among the municipalities that have decided to require private development 
projects to be "green buildings" or include green design elements, the most 
common method of regulation is to require the developer to demonstrate 
that its building could achieve LEED certification. 15 Part III also provides 
12. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The 
Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YAlE L. & PoL' Y REv. 23, 25 
(1996 ) ("A fundamental issue is how to allocate regulatory authority so that political institutions 
and processes will yield policies that achieve the optimal or efficient level of pollution without 
imposing unnecessary costs on productive economic activity."). 
13. Voice is the ability to influence a political process through active participation, while exit 
is aggressive nonparticipation in the process, such as the ability not to comply with a regulation. 
JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL, PROPERTY 1064 (6th ed. 2006). See also WIW AM A. FISCHEL, 
REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, E CONOMICS, AND Pouncs ( 1995). 
14. See infra note 22 and accompanying text. 
15. These ordinances come in the form of new chapters or sections in zoning or planning 
codes, as well as in building co des. 
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background on the emergence, composition, and practices ofthe entity that 
created the LEED green building standards, the USGBC: a national, non­
profit organization comprisin~members ofthe building industry and others 
interested in green building. 1 Finally, this Part explains LEED as it was 
meant to operate- as a private, voluntary market mechanism- and analyze 
why municipalities have decided to adopt it into their codes. 
Part IV begins an analysis of the form and content ofprivate municipal 
green building mandates by first laying out the twin goals of a green 
building regime: efficacy and legitimate process. Next, this Part describes a 
spectrum of possible approaches to development and enforcement of green 
building standards, ranging from purely public to purely private. Using this 
framework, Part IV analyzes the type of green building regime that would 
best achieve the goals of efficacy and legitimate process. 
Part V focuses on the content ofLEED-based green building ordinances 
with respect to the first regime goal: efficacy. This Part first argues that 
cities should promulgate green building requirements locally, taking into 
account specific local building-related and environmental concerns. Part V 
then addresses the need for public bodies to be more cognizant of 
translation problems that are involved in borrowing private rules. Finally, 
this Part argues that allowing private, industry-based organizations to 
promulgate standards that bind their own industries is not the most 
efficacious manner in which to ensure the strongest cost-effective 
environmental protection measures. Specifically, industry-derived uniform 
regulations tend to be inflexible and are often set too low to achieve real 
benefits. 
Part VI turns to the means by which LEED-based green building 
ordinances are promulgated and the second regime goal: legitimate 
process. This Part raises concerns that the LEED promulgation process is 
not legitimate when translated from a voluntary standard to a mandate. A 
public process for developing standards would better address process 
concerns, including democracy, transparency, notice, voice, and exit. 
Finally, Part VI addresses the fact that private entities are not subject to the 
same open government requirements as are public agencies, and thus a 
public standards-development process would foster a more legitimate 
regulatory process. 
16. U.S. Green Building Council. About USGBC. http: //www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx? 
CMSPageiD=l24 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). The USGBC is a fine example of what some refer to 
as "quangos" -quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organizations. See Clark Havighurst, 
Foreword: the Place of Private Accrediting Among the Instruments of Government. 57 LAW & 
CoNIEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (1994); see also King & King, supra note 2 , at 406 ("In a classic example of 
industry self-regulation, members of the (USGBC), composed of representatives of all segments of 
the U.S. building industry, developed consensus-based national standards for use in constructing 
high-performance, sustainable buildings."). 
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This Article concludes by explaining that a city, once having adopted a 
LEED-based green building ordinance, will falsely believe that it has 
sufficiently addressed its environmental concerns. In reality, this "solution" 
sticks a band-aid on a major wound , calls the process successful, and stops 
there. To avoid such a problem, this Article poses alternative formulations 
for private municipal green building ordinances: If cities are going to 
create a green building regime based on requirements, rather than 
incentives, they should promulgate those requirements locally, taking into 
account specific local building-related and environmental concerns. 
Moreover, the development should take place under the auspices of public 
governmental bodies, not private, industry-based organizations. Using 
these methods will result in a green building requirements regime that 
ensures stronger protection against climate change and local environmental 
harms, as well as a transparent and democratic governmental process 
resistant to industry capture. 
II. 	 FEDERALISM AND THE GLOBAL COMMONS-THE APPROPRIATE 
SCALE OF GREEN BUILDING REGULATION 
A. Legal Background: A Local Government's Ability to Regulate 
Land use is an area of the law traditionally regulated by local 
governments through zoning, planning, subdivision, or building codes. 17 A 
munici gality is able to regulate an individual's use of her land via its police 
power. 8 Historically, governments use their police power to restrict private 
rights in the interests of health, safety, morals, and general welfare. 19 
Municipalities apply this Rolice power to private real property through 
zoning and building codes. 20 
Notwithstanding their police power, local governments are still subject 
to sometimes ineffective national and state initiatives. However, with 
respect to the issue of climate change, for example, little cohesive action 
has been taken at either the federal or state level to combat the problem. 
Building practices, which contribute to climate change, also contribute to 
numerous local environmental issues, including air and water quality, 
stormwater management, and landfill space for construction waste, to 
name a few. Thus, local governments have begun to step in to tackle these 
Issues. 
17 . E LUCKSON & BEEN, supra note 9, at 34. 
18. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954). The police power offers sufficient 
justification for governmental involvement in and oversight of green building requirements. See 
Circa , supra note 11, at 744. 
19. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32-33 ("The concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive. The 
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.") (internal 
citations omitted). 
20. E LU CKSON & BEEN, supra note 9 , at 86. 
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Local zoning regulations were initially created to address public health 
issues in growing cities. 21 Similarly, the new trend of requiring green 
building elements in the construction of new buildings is grounded in 
health concerns for both citizens and the environment, resulting from 
climate change as well as a variety of local environmental externalities 
related to building construction. 22 
B. Scale: International, National, or Local Regulation 
Before considering the twin goals of efficacy and legitimate process, 
various issues of scale must be examined to determine what level of 
government is best suited to impose green building requirements on private 
developers, including the scale of externalities (local, regional, national, 
and global) and the scale of expertise (national problems require experts 
with nationwide experience, whereas local problems require local 
knowledge and experience). Although the larger issue of concern, climate 
change, is certainly an international problem, the burdens placed on 
developers and a building's impact are inherently local issues. 
1. An International or National System Will Not Sufficiently 
Address Local Environmental Impairments 
If you were to ask local government officials why their cities adopted 
green building ordinances, you would likely hear that they wanted to be at 
the vanguard of the environmental and climate change reduction 
movements.23 Indeed, as one commentator notes, "[t]he key underlying 
21. See, e.g., § 1 of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act passed by Hoover's Commerce 
Department in the early decades of the twentieth century which stated, 
[s]uch regulations [are] ... designed to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure 
safety from fire, panic, and other dangers; to promote health and the general 
welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding ofland; to 
facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, 
and other public requirements. 
22. See, e.g., PASADENA, CAL, MUN. CODE tit. 14, § 14.90.020 (2009), available at 
http: I/library.m unicode. com/index. aspx ?clientiD= 16551 &sta teiD=5&stateN ame=Califomia. ("[I]t 
is the purpose of this [Green Building Practices] chapter to ... [i]mprove the health of residents, 
visitors, and workers by counteracting negative environmental impacts associated with building 
construction and occupation."); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., BUIIJ)ING CODE ch. 13C, § 1301 C (2009), 
availableathttp: //www.amlegal.com/nx Ugateway.dll?f=templates&fn=defaulthtm&vid=amlegal: 
sf_building ("The purpose of this chapter [imposing green building requirements on private 
development] is to promote the health, safety and welfare of San Francisco residents, workers, and 
visitors by minimizing the use and waste of energy, water and other resources in the construction 
and operation of the City and County of San Francisco's building stock and by providing a healthy 
indoor environment."). 
23. See also PALO ALTO, CAL. , MUN. CODE, ch. 18.44 (2009); Palo Alto , Cal. Ordinance No. 
5006 (June 2, 2008), available at http ://www.cityofpaloalto.org/civica/filebank/blobdload.asp?b 
lobid=l7719 ("The City's Climate Protection Plan (CPP). . identifies green building as an 
important approach to reducing greenhouse gases generated in the Palo Alto community. The CPP 
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issue motivating green building work[] is the threat of climate change. "24 
Buildings account for approximately 39% of all energy used in the United 
States, 38% of greenhouse gas emissions, 40% of raw materials used, and 
14% of potable water consumption. 25 Further, it is undeniable that climate 
change is a problem of global proportions.26 This has led some legal 
commentators to state that only a global-level approach can solve this 
global problem, and thus local governments (and even states or individual 
countries) should not take independent action without an international 
. 1 27mandate m p ace. 
Support for this bias against local action in the climate change context 
is typically supplied by two theories: ( 1) the "Matching Principle, " which 
holds that "the size of the geographic area affected by a specific pollution 
source should determine the appropriate governmental level for responding 
to the pollution" and suggests that international action is required to 
address the global climate change crisis; 28 or (2) a "race to the bottom" 
theory-a concern that, in the absence of an international or federal 
requirement, state and local governments will lower the level of 
environmental protection that is required by industries within their 
jurisdictions in an attempt to attract those industries. 29 
These theories, which have been thoroughly analyzed in the literature 
with respect to environmental pollution,30 are underpinned by a general 
notes that building construction and maintenance accounts for approximately 38% of U.S. 
greenhouse gas emissions (U.S. Department of Energy) and approximately 40% of the energy use in 
the Palo Alto community. Buildings also account for much of the 14% of emissions that are 
generated by waste materials.''). 
24. Bradford Swing, Project-Based Policy Development: Building the Case for Boston's 
Green Building Policy, 11 N.Y. U. J. LEGIS. & PuB. PoL'Y 33, 50 (2008). 
25. U.S. Green Bldg. Council, Green Building Facts 1 (2009), available at 
http://www. usgbc. org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentiD=5961. 
26. Engel & Saleska, supra note 7, at 184 (referring to climate change as "perhaps the 
foremost global commons problem facing the world today"). 
27. Engel & Saleska, supranote7, at 187; RobertN. Stavins, PolicyinstrumentsforClimate 
Change: How Can National Governments Address a Global Problem?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293. 
28. Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 25 (noting that the geographic size determines the level 
of governmental spending as "[t]here is no need for the regulating jurisdiction to be larger than the 
regulated activity"); see also Engel & Saleska, supra note 7, at 187. 
29. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to -the­
Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y. U. L. REv. 1210, 1210 (1992); 
Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State 
Implementation ofNational Environmental Policy, 86 Y ALEL.J. 1196, 1212 (1977). 
30. See generally David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case 
Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1796 (2008) 
(discussing race to the bottom and Matching Principle, ultimately rejecting Matching Principle in 
favor of an adaptive model for environmental regulation); Jonathan H. Adler, When is Two a 
Crowd? The Impact of Federal Action on State Environmental Regulation, 31 HARV. ENV1L. L. 
REv. 67 (2007 ) (discussing race to the bottom theory as a factor that affects a state's regulatory 
scheme); Butler & Macey, supra note 12 (criticizing race to the bottom theory and developing 
Matching Principle); Stewart, supra note 29 (reflecting seminal work arguing in favor of federal 
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"tragedy of the commons" argument: rational, individual local 
governments should have no incentive to take action against climate 
change when that action will not have a measurable impact on the larger 
climate change problem and will instead result in a decrease in their 
benefits from the commons because they have to bear the costs of the 
regulations? 1 While there is general consensus about these issues in the 
broadest sense, some commentators suggest that unilateral action against 
climate change by actors on a smaller scale can still make sense. 32 
Although buildings certainly contribute to the global climate change 
problem, they more specifically and immediately result in local 
environmental externalities, including sedimentation and erosion caused by 
runoff, landfill overuse due to construction and demolition debris, and 
deleterious effects on public health?3 These intrinsically local problems 
vary from area to area and thus require a localized understanding of and 
expertise about how buildings relate to and impact the local environment. 
Indeed, both the Matching Principle and the race to the bottom theory can 
be used to support this assertion. 
2. The Matching Principle and Local Action 
The Matching Principle holds that the regulating jurisdiction should not 
be larger than the regulated activity.34 When addressing problems of 
climate change, most commentators focus on global warming as a global 
concern and reason that an international (or at least national) response is 
necessary?5 However, Henry Butler and Jonathan Macey, who devised the 
Matching Principle, believed that "many important environmental 
problems are problems of purely local concern, and should be regulated at 
the local level. "3 6 In fact, when there are "purely local externalities," Butler 
and Macey state unequivocally that those should be dealt with locally?7 
Determining whether the externalities that result from buildings are 
environmental regulation, pointing out a race to the bottom as one rationale in favor of the 
centralization of policy). 
31. Engel & Saleska, supra note 7 , at 190-91. 
32. Engel & Saleska, supra note 7 , at 188; see also Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal­
Mart Effect: The Role ofPrivate Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REv. 913, 964--­
65 (2007 ) ("[T]he national and international public law regime on its o wn has been unable to 
address a number of environmental problems that pose grave threats. . Development and 
enforcement of multilateral international regulatory requirements has been difficult."). 
33. These are costs that are external to the builder or developer, and are often entirely 
absorbed by the locality. 
34. Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 25. 
35. Engel & Saleska, supra note 7 , at 187 ("With respect to global environmental problems 
such as global climate change or ozone depletion, the 'matching principle' calls for an international 
framework of response ...." ). 
36. Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 26. 
37 . Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 32. 
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purely local is difficult because buildings do not fit neatly into the silo of 
ambient environmental polluters that are traditionally analyzed under these 
theories. Stationary sources of pollution, such as factories releasing sulfur 
dioxide or landfills that cause seepage and groundwater pollution, directly 
contribute to local externalities in ways that buildings do not. Further, 
those types of polluters exist and regulations aim to reduce their pollution 
contribution, whereas green building requirements are forward-looking, 
and dictate the way that new (currently non-existing) buildings will be 
constructed. However, by looking at existing green building regulations 
and which features of buildings they seek to change, we can work 
backwards to discover some of the environmental harms that result from 
buildings and that have an impact on those not receiving any benefits from 
the buildings. 
Traditional, older, "non-green" buildings often negatively impact 
localities in numerous ways. In drought-prone areas, older buildings with 
leaky sinks and a lack of low-flow plumbing fixtures use water in 
unsustainable ways. Similarly, over their lifetimes, older buildings 
consume dramatically more energy than new, energy-efficient buildings­
especially new green buildings designed with energy-conservation 
principles in mind.38 Additionally, many older buildings contain paints and 
coatings with high levels ofVolatile Organic Compounds (VOCs), which 
negatively contribute to indoor air quality, and thus adversely impact the 
health of building occupants?9 Further, in many cities, buildings have been 
located and positioned in ways that result in substantial shadow impacts, 
thus depriving citizens of the sun. 40 
New building practices also result in substantial environmental 
externalities. In many localities, instead of locating large commercial 
buildings downtown, zoning codes place them in suburban corporate 
campus environments, isolating them from homes and parks.41 
38. Interestingly, buildings located in different parts of the country have different levels of 
C02 emissions based on the source of their electricity. Many buildings in the Northwest use 
electricity produced from hydropower, which results in fewer c~ emissions than many buildings in 
the Midwest that use electricity from coal. See Energy Star, Carbon Emissions from Building 
Energy Use, http :1/www. energy star. gov /index. cfm ?c=evaluate _performance. bus _portfoliomanager_ 
carbon (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). 
39. Environmental Protection Agency, An Introduction to Indoor Air Quality, 
http://www.epa.gov/iaq/voc.htrul (last visited Jan. 24, 2010 ). Some might question whether this is 
actually an externality, as the building occupants do also obtain some benefits from use of the 
building. Ho wever, the building occupants, such as workers, do not get any of the profits from 
purchasing or owning the building. Thus, their sufferings are properly considered externalities. 
40. To avoid this problem, some localities require shadow studies prior to approving a 
project. See, e.g., CITY OF Los ANGElES, CEQA THRESHOLDS GUIDE A.3-2 (2006), available at 
http: I I environmentla. org/programs/Thresholds/ A-Aesthetics%2 Oand%20 Visual %20Resources. pdf 
("A project impact would normally be considered significant if shadow-sensitive uses would be 
shaded by project-related structures for more than three hours ...."'). 
41. Charles Lockwood, Building the Green Way, HARV. Bus. REv. , June 2006, at 129, 132. 
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Commercial buildings so located are typically far from public transit, 
requiring multiple individual car trips in order to reach the buildings, 
which in turn contributes to the consumption of more fossil fuel and 
emissions release. 42 These buildin,5s also often seem inauthentic, resulting 
in areas that lack a sense of place. Finally, an abundance of waste results 
from the construction of new buildings, most of which is not recycled or 
reused, and thus ends up in locallandfills.44 These are only a few of the 
many types of local environmental externalities that buildings impose on 
citizens living in or near them, which cities would like to eliminate or 
decrease via the imposition of green building requirements.45 Because 
these building-related externalities are inherently local, pursuant to the 
Matching Principle, they should be addressed at the local level. Moreover, 
as evidenced by the chart below, the scale of local environmental 
externalities caused by buildings swamps those at the regional, national, 
and global levels. 
A Sample ofBuildinR-Related Environmental Externalities 46 
Local Regional National Global 
High and inefficient water usage by Air quality impacts Depletion of Climate Change/ greenhouse 
older buildings depletes a locality's due to automobile naturally occurring gas emissions 
water supply travel to and from building materials, 
buildings including forests 
Local stream and river quality River quality Manufacture and 
impacts due to effluent and impacts due to transportation of 
42. /d. at 132. 
43. Studies have shown negative psychological impacts on workers and worker satisfaction as 
a result of their physical surroundings. In contrast, studies show that workers in green buildings are 
typically happier and healthier, both physically and mentally. See id. at 130 (citing studies that 
found up to a fifteen percent increase in employee productivity, less sick time, and increased morale 
and employee satisfaction in green buildings). 
44. See id. at 129 (discussing the benefits of green building over standard building because 
green construction recycles building waste). 
45. As an example, the "driving force" behind Washington D.C.'s adoption of a private green 
building requirement was to improve their local environmental conditions, including heat island 
effect, storm water runoff contributing to deplorable river quality conditions, and poor air quality. 
Telephone Interview with Zach Dobelbower, D.C. Neighborhood Plauning Coordinator, Ward 2 
Member ofGreen Building Task Force (Oct. 9 , 2008); see also PALOALTO, CAL, MUN. CODE, ch. 
18.44 (2009); Palo Alto, Cal. Ordinance No. 5006 (June 2 , 2008) , available at 
http://www. cityofpaloalto. org/civica/filebank/blobdload. asp?blobid= 177 19 ("[ G]reen building 
design, construction, restoration, operation, and maintenance can have a significant positive effect 
on energy, water, and resource conservation, waste management and pollution generation, and the 
health and productivity of a property's residents, workers, and visitors over the life of a building 
and/or site. " ). 
46. As the title of this table makes clear, it contains only a sample of the myriad externalities 
that result from building construction. Further, though some of the externalities listed as local may, 
on a larger scale, result in additional regional externalities as well, those effects would be minimal 
in relation to the substantial local effects. 
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storm water runoff (including 
runoff from roofs that contain 
asbestos or petroleum materials) 
effluent and 
stormwater runoff 
synthetic building 
materials 
Runoff from synthetic materials is 
faster than runoff from natural 
surfaces, resulting in more erosion 
and sedimentation 
Development near groundwater 
recharge areas results in 
I _groundwater pollution 
Buildings consume large amounts 
of available local energy supply 
Local zoning results in separation 
of uses, necessitating automobile 
trips, resulting in consumption of 
local supplies of petroleum and 
release of emissions 
Local zoning results in uses that are 
far from public transit, 
necessitating automobile trips, 
resulting in consumption of local 
supplies of petroleum and release 
of emissions 
Local zoning results in separation 
of uses, which results in 
construction of more, longer, and 
less efficient infrastructure, which 
uses more materials (pipes, 
concrete) and causes more 
construction impacts 
Local zoning may result in 
communities that lack a sense of 
place due to the location of 
buildings and mix of uses 
Indoor air quality impacts due to 
high-VOC paints and coatings 
Construction and demolition waste 
winds up in local landfills 
Heat Island Effect 
Of course, not every city's buildings have these same problems. For 
example, cities in the wet Pacific Northwest have fewer water conservation 
concerns for their buildings than do cities in the dry Nevada desert. 
Similarly, the Manhattans and San Franciscos of the country do not have 
corporate campus-type developments within their city limits that are far 
from public transit. The opposite is true for suburbs like Alpharetta, 
Georgia or Round Rock, Texas. These distinct characteristics further 
illustrate the need for local, individualized regulation to alleviate specific, 
local environmental concerns. 
Thus, any attempt to apply a nationwide green building "solution" to 
these problems would result in cities with fewer building-related 
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externalities being forced to bear the same costs as those cities with more 
problems without receiving the same corresponding benefits. 47 This is an 
inherent problem with reliance on a uniform nationwide set of green 
building standards: the fundamental determinations of what constitutes a 
"green building" will be decided by a single entity without any specific 
consideration given to the unique environmental, social, and political 
concerns of different localities. To prevent the development of new 
buildings that continue to contribute to these localized externalities, local 
governments should develop individualized green building programs that 
seek to address and avoid their local problems as well as the larger 
problem of climate change. 
In summary, requiring a single building to incorporate green elements 
may reduce local environmental externalities, but it will not reduce levels 
of global warming because the impact would be so small as to be de 
minimis. On the other hand, national regulation aimed at all buildings is 
not tailored enough to address specific local environmental externalities, 
but it might reduce levels of global warming. However, as evidenced by 
the chart above, a desire to minimize the large number of local 
environmental externalities that result from buildings gives local 
governments a strong enough incentive to take action themselves to require 
more environmentally friendly building construction practices.48 This self­
interest on the part of localities will solve any coordination problem, and 
the positive aggregate impacts on climate change resulting from these 
green building ordinances will piggyback onto the specifically local 
benefits.49 Thus, we must consider the localized benefits of green building, 
such as conserving local supplies of water and energy, encouraging the use 
and reuse of local building materials and supplies, contributing to better 
indoor and outdoor environmental air quality, healthier city residents, and 
happier building occupants.50 These are inherently local responses to 
purely local concerns, and thus, pursuant to the Matching Principle, a local 
regulatory scheme should address these issues. 5 1 
47. Butler & Macey. supra note 12, at 55. 
48. This is, perhaps, the reason that so many municipalities have begun to voluntarily adopt 
green building ordinances. 
49. Although a global or national solution to climate change will not necessarily have any 
positive impacts on local environmental problems, a local solution to environmental problems will, 
in the aggregate, have a positive impact on larger, global problems. 
50. Building design impacts not only a city's form, but also its energy consumption, the 
health of its indoor air, and the people who work and live in these buildings. See Lockwood, supra 
note 41, at 130. 
51. Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 31 ("Allo cation of regulatory authority over local 
externalities to local governments allows decisions to be made by the representatives of the citizens 
who benefit the most from and pay the most for higher environmental quality."). 
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3. The Race to the Bottom and Local Action 
Notwithstanding the Matching Principle, one justification often used to 
support a larger, national approach to environmental concerns (instead of a 
piecemeal local one) is that of preventing a "race to the bottom. "52 For 
example, if City A passes a strict, local, environmentally related zoning 
ordinance, but City B does not, a developer would have an incentive to 
take her business to City B to avoid having to comply with City A's 
ordinance, thereby saving herself money. 5 3 
Race-to-the-bottom theorists hold that national regulations equal~ 
applicable to all regulatees, regardless of location, avoid this problem. 4 
Thus, one possible benefit of a national green building standard would be 
that it would alleviate the race to the bottom.55 Similarly, a nationally­
promulgated green building standard would equalize green building 
requirements. This would be good because it would normalize developers' 
expectations; they would understand what a "green building" was and if 
they built one in City C, they could follow the same methods in City D. 
Further, national standards would benefit building product manufacturers, 
who often sell their products on a national market, and would benefit 
builders who work across regions or nationwide. 
Despite these purported benefits of federal-level environmental and 
green building regulation, literature also suggests that the race to the 
bottom is not, in fact, determinative, and that states and cities will enact 
stringent regulations even when a federal mandate is lacking. 56 Indeed, an 
individual or industry is not solely concerned with the taxes it will have to 
pay and expenses related to building standards, but also with what "bundle 
of services" it will receive from locating in a city, such as open space, 
public services, and cultural opportunities. 57 Further, commentators have 
noted that local governments do not all reason in the same way when 
52. This theory suggests that federal environmental regulation is necessary to prevent states, 
who are in competition for industry, from setting pollution control standards that are not stringent 
enough; "a race from the desirable levels of environmental quality that states would pursue if they 
did not face competition for industry to the increasingly undesirable levels that they choose in the 
face of such competition." Revesz, supra note 29, at 1210. The theory is also used as a basis for 
declaring local environmental regulation as inadequate. See Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 34. 
53. This would result in a loss ofjobs and tax revenue to City A, which would then consider 
repealing the strict ordinance. See Revesz, supra n o te 29 , at 1216. 
54. Revesz , supra note 29, at 121 7 . 
55. Revesz, supra note 29 , at 121 7 . 
56. Revesz, supra note 29, at 1233 ("[T]here is no support in the theoretical literature on 
interjurisdictional competition for the claim that, withou t federal intervention, there will be a race to 
the bottom over environmental standards."); Aseem Prakash & Matthew Potoski , Racing to the 
Bottom? Trade, Environmental Governance, and ISO 14001, 50 AM. J. PoL Sc r. 350,352 (2006) 
("While NGOs typically claim races to the bottom are quite common, scholars have found little 
empirical support for them.") (citations omitted). 
57 . Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory ofLocal Expenditures, 64 J. Po L Ec oN. 41 6 , 419 
(1956 ), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1826343. 
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imposing environmental standards. 5 8 Thus, with respect to green buildings, 
the race to the bottom does not provide determinative support for an 
exclusively national or international regime. 
Typically, developers choose locations for specific, economic-driven 
reasons. A building located in San Francisco will likely be more expensive 
to permit and erect than a building constructed in Bowling Green, 
Kentucky. However, the building in San Francisco will also be able to take 
in higher rents, will likely have a higher occupancy rate, and will be 
situated in a location that provides access to numerous public parks, transit, 
and cosmopolitan and business opportunities. This illustrates the 
importance that locality plays when a developer is making a decision about 
which market to enter. Unlike pure environmental pollution regulations, 
green building ordinances are, at base, land use regulations. The race to the 
bottomjustification for federal environmental laws has never gained much 
traction in suggesting that land use regulation should be conducted at a 
national level. This is because land use issues are inherently local issues, 
impacting citizens in ways that sweeping environmental legislation (and 
problems) does not. Thus, unlike some other types ofenvironmental issues 
that could conceivably result in a race to the bottom, because locality is so 
important to the construction of buildings, local regulations are more 
favorable than national ones.59 
Despite the line of theorists that point to global and national-level 
solutions to the problem ofclimate change, the foregoing analysis supports 
a conclusion that local government regulation is more appropriate to 
handle the more nuanced, specifically local externalities that buildings 
force onto their local communities.60 This local emphasis comports with 
58. Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 43-44 ("Localities have different preferences for 
environmental quality, for a variety of economic and aesthetic reasons, and it is not at all clear that 
competition between jurisdictions will lead to a lowerlevel of environmental quality than would a 
national median voter mo del."). 
59. Indeed, if we look at the way green building regulations are playing out in cities and 
counties across the country , we see no evidence of a race to the bottom. In the nascent green 
building arena, cities are requiring green buildings from private developers in the absence offederal 
regulations. More generally, many states have set environmental regulations that are stricter than 
those imposed by federal environmental programs. See, e.g. , Clean Air Act§ 209(a), (b), (e) , 42 
U.S. C. § 7 543 (2006); Colorado Hazardous Waste Regulations, 6 Co LO. CODE REGs. 1007 -3, 
§ 261.5(f)(3)(iv) (2009) (noting no onsite-disposal by conditionally exemptsmall quantity 
generators); see also Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Laboratories for Local Solutions for Global 
Problems: State, Local and Private Leadership in Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes 
and Effects of Climate Change, 12 PENN ST. ENV1L. L. REv. 15, 16 (2004) ("[M]an y states and 
localities are responding to the lack of federal leadership on the issue of climate change by 
establishing their own programs to limit emissions of greenhouse gases(' GHGs') and to sequester 
those gases."). 
60. See supra Part II.B.2. (referencing table titled "A Sample of Building-Related 
Environmental Ex ternalities" which demonstrates that there are numerous local externalities and a 
paucity of regional, national, or global ones). 
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traditional notions of federalism and is consistent with the Matching 
61
Principle. Finally, as will be discussed in more detail below, local 
governments are in fact taking action to regulate these issues at a local 
level. However, this analysis also cautions that those local governments 
should refrain from importing nationally developed green building 
standards into their local codes without first taking into consideration the 
local externalities addressed above. To do otherwise is to allow national 
regulation of a predominantly local problem. 
III. TAKE ME TOYOUR LEEDER: WHO DEVELOPED LEED GREEN 

BUILDING STANDARDS AND WHY? 

A. The United States Green Building Council (USGBC/2 
The USGBC was founded by building industry stakeholders who were 
interested in developing green buildings. 63 While membership today is 
more diverse, the organization is still primarily populated by building 
64industry insiders. LEED is a "Green Building Rating System;" a third­
61. Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 53 ("Traditional federalism theory tells us that local 
government regulation should be preferred whenever appropriate so that regulations reflect the 
environmental-quality preferences of the affected parties, as well as to allow for jmisdictional 
competition and diversity."). The LEED approach removes the benefits of competition and 
diversity, and instead separates localities only based on whether they do or do not impose green 
building standards on private developments. 
62. The USGBC is a 50 l(c)(3) non-profit corporation that was formed in April of 1993. DuN 
& BRADSTREET, CORPORATE FiliNG, U.S. GREEN BUiilllNG COUNCIL, INC. (filed Apr. 6, 1993) (on 
file with author). The organization's stated purpose is "transform the way buildings and 
communities are designed, built and operated, enabling an environmentally and socially 
responsible, healthy, and prosperous environment that improves the quality of life." About USBGC, 
http: //www. usgbc. org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageiD=l24 (last visited Feb. 9, 2010). 
63. Certainly, it was a subset of the building industry that founded the USGBC-those who 
self-identify as "green." We cannot know whether these individuals truly wanted only the 
environmental benefits of a greener building industry, whether they saw a commercial advantage in 
being at the leading edge of this emerging green commo dity, or whether they were just feigning an 
interest. Regardless, as will be discussed further below, these members of the building industry 
were still, on some level, motivated by private interest and bottom-line costs. 
64. U.S. GREEN BUILDING CoUNCIL, BYlAWS 4 (2008), available at 
http://www. usgbc. org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentiD=l7 32. 
Membership in the Council is balanced through organizational representation 
by the following [twelve] membership groups ('Membership Groups' ): 1) 
Building Product Manufacturers (including Building Controls 
Manufacturers/Building Operations and Maintenance); 2) Contractors and 
Builders; 3) Corporate and Retail; 4) Educational and Research Institutions (both 
public and private including K-12, colleges and universities); 5) Environmental 
and Non-profit Organizations; 6) Federal Government; 7) Finance and Insmance 
Community (institutions, appraisers, accountants); 8) Professional Firms 
(including, but not limited to architectural, engineering, consultants, legal, design 
and technical); 9) Professional Societies and Trade Associations; 10) Real Estate 
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party certification program created and administered by the USG BC. 65 A 
developer seeking LEED certification must pay the USGBC to register and 
certify its project and incorporate a number of checklist-based green 
elements into the building's design and construction. 66 
B. 	The Development and Promulgation ofLEED Standards by the 
USGBC 
To understand how the USGBC develops and adopts LEED standards, 
it is first important to understand the basic structure ofthe organization and 
the characteristics of those within it who create and implement the 
standards.67 At the top of the LEED hierarchy, and working in conjunction 
with USGBC Staff and its Board of Directors (Board), is the LEED 
Steering Committee.68 For issues that require technical expertise, the 
Steering Committee relies on USGBC' s Technical Advisory Groups 
(TAGs)- the experts who are tasked with "maintaining consistency and 
technical rigor" as standards are revised and developed. 69 
and Real Estate Service Providers (including building owners, developers, 
property managers); 11) State and Local Governments; 12) Utilities, ESCOs and 
Energy Service Providers. 
!d. The organization has also grown; it now has more than seventy-five chapters throughout the 
United States. U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, ABOUT USGBC 4 (2008), available at 
http: //www. usgbc. org/ShowFile. aspx?DocumentiD=4896. 
65. LEED PoLICY MANUAL 5~6 (2008) available at http :1/www. usgbc. org/showfile. aspx?Doc 
umentiD=2039 [hereinafter LEED POLICY MANUAL]. 
66. See LEED Project Registration and Certification Fees, 
http: //www.gbci.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageiD=l27 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). The USGBC 
administers the LEED program with the help of LEED Accredited Professionals, or LEED APs, 
who are primarily building industry players (architects, project managers, contractors, engineers, 
etc.) who have taken the LEED AP Exam. See Green Building Certification Institute List of LEED 
APs by Area of Practice, http ://gbci.cyzap.neUgbcicertonline/onlinedirectory/ (last visited Jan. 24, 
2010). However, in fact, anyone can be a LEED AP if she has taken and passed the test; there are 
no other prerequisites. See LEED AP, http: // www. gbci. org/displaypage. aspx?CM SpageiD=84 (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2009). 
67. The following paragraphs do not fully describe all USGBC or LEED-related co=ittees, 
but rather those that contribute to the standard-making process. USGBC members are typically 
businesses, corporations, or other entities that are involved in the building industry in some way and 
have a commitment to using green building practices. For example, a quick member search on the 
USGBC' s web site reveals various local government units, individual contracting firms, and 
educational institutes (ranging from local public school systems to large universities) that are 
members of the USGBC in the United States. See USGBC: Member Directory, 
http://www. usgbc. org/myUSGBC/Members/MembersDirectory.aspx (last visited Nov. 9, 2009) 
(search by Membership Category and Country). 
68. The Steering Committee establishes and enforces LEED direction and policy, and 
generally oversees all LEED committee activities. LEED POUCY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 11~12. 
69. LEED POLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 12. TAGs respond to relevant credit rulings 
and interpretations. Id. 
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Upon development of a new LEED standard, the USGBC creates a 
corresponding committee.70 Any USGBC member with an interest in the 
new standard can be a member of the corresponding committee.71 
Corresponding committee members are not necessarily experts, but 
typically have an interest in the new product, and want to receive updates 
about its development.72 The USGBC then recruits members for a core 
product development committee; this is the committee that will actually 
create the content ofthe new LEED standard?3 Some members of the core 
committee are appointed while others are selected through a web-based 
election of corresponding committee members?4 
Although the USGBC has a "Balance and Participation" policy, through 
which they "strive to involve different types ofmembers in the discussions 
and consideration of proposed" new standards,75 they do not require 
involvement of all member categories on all committees; rather, a 
requirement establishes that a "minimum of [five] member categories"will 
be represented on each LEED committee?6 Thus, it is entirely}?ossible that 
only building industry insiders could comprise a committee. 
In the context of creating a new LEED standard the core committee 
receives input from the TAGs on creation of criteria.78 Because TAGs are 
technical bodies, all members are appointed, based on their expertise, and 
there is no requirement that they contain a mix ofmembership categories?9 
Thus, all members of a TAG could be technical experts from within the 
70. LEED Committees, http ://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageiD=l750 (last 
visited Jan. 24, 20 10). 
7 1. !d. 
72. !d. The corresponding committees can be unlimited in size. LEED PouCY MANUAL, supra 
note 65, at 14. 
73. LEED PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND MAlNI"ENANCE MANUAL 6 (2006), available at 
http: //www. usg be. org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentiD=2040. 
74. !d. A call for nominees for appointment to a new core committee is made to the 
corresponding committee members. In the case of vacancies on an existing core committee, the 
members of that core committee will select and appoint the new member(s) , with approval from the 
LEED management subcommittee and the Board's executive committee. LEED, COMMITTEE 
CHARTERS: FoUNDATIONS OF THE LEADERSHIP 1N ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN 
ENVIRONMENTAL RATING SYSTEM A TOOL FOR MARKET TRANSRJRMATION 8 (2006), available at 
http://www. usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentiD=2041 [hereinafter LEED COMMITTEE 
CHARTERS] 
75. Cf LEED, COMMITTEE CHARTERS, supra note 74, at 21-22. 
76. !d. 
77 . For example, the following five member categories might be represented: Building 
Product Manufacturers; Contractors and Builders; Corporate and Retail; Professional Firms; and 
Real Estate and Real Estate Service Providers. Thus, no members from the government, education, 
or environmental categories would be able to contribute. LEEDCoMMITTEECHARTERS, supra note 
74 ("The TAGs are exempt from the need to demonstrate balance across member categories because 
their role is primarily technical and not market based"). 
78. LEED PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 6. 
79. LEED COMMITTEE CHARTERS, supra note 74, at 21-22. 
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building industry. 
LEED standards are purportedly created through a "consensus-based 
decision-making" process, which is described by the USGBC as one that 
"encourages members and any interested stakeholder to submit comments 
to committees."80 Thus, once a core committee has created a draft ofthe 
new LEED standards in conjunction with the TAGs, the LEED Steering 
Committee and the USGBC Board must approve the draft for release for 
public comment.81 The USGBC posts the proposed standards on its 
website, and members ofthe public (USGBC members and non-members) 
can make comments within a thirty-day period.82 The USGBC then collates 
all comments received, resRonds to each, and revises the draft standards in 
response to the comments. 83 A revised draft and summary of comments 
and responses is posted online, and an additional fifteen-day comment 
period begins.84 During this second comment period, the public may only 
comment on items that were revised based on the prior round of 
comments. 85 
Certain changes to the LEED standards, including adoption of new 
80. INFORMATION: CONSENSUS, USGBC POLICIES & GUIDEI.lNES, available at 
http: //www. usgbc. org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentiD=3350 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). Additionally, 
" [ t ]he committee structure, with its balanced representation of stakeholders and conflict of interest 
policies, ensures that the development of LEED versions is consensus based and even-handed." 
LEED Po LICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 18. More generally, voluntary consensus standards bodies 
are defined as ones that have the following attributes: 
(i) Openness[;] (ii) Balance of interest[;) (iii) Due process[;] (vi) An appeals 
process[;] (v) Consensus, which is defined as general agreement, but not 
necessarily unanimity, and includes a process for attempting to resolve objections 
by interested parties, as long as all comments have been fairly considered, each 
objector is advised of the disposition of his or her objection(s) and the reasons 
why, and the consensus body members are given an opportunity to change their 
votes after reviewing the comments. 
0FFICEOFMGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OFTIIEPRESIDENT, OMB CIR. No. A-119, FEDERAL 
PARTICIPATION IN TIIE DEVELOPMENT AND UsE OF VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS STANDARDS AND IN 
CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES § 4 ( 1 99 8), available at http :1/standards. gov Istandards_gov /a 
119.cfm. 
81. LEED POLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 25. 
82. Telephone interview with Deon Glaser, USGBC, Manager, LEED Technical 
Development (Oct. 10, 2008); see also LEED POLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 25. 
83. LEED PoLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 25.The LEED Steering Committee must 
approve revisions to the product or item. LEED POLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 25. Members of 
the Core Committees, which comprise the Steering Committee, or USGBC staff are responsible for 
responding to comments from Corresponding members, and should do so within 2-4 weeks of 
receiving the comment. LEED P OLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 14. 
84. LEED PoLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 25. 
85. LEED POIJCY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 25. Most connents are received during the first 
comment period. For example, the first comment period for the most recent update to the LEED 
standards resulted in 5800 comments. The second round of comments only brought in 900 
comments. Interview with Deon Glaser, supra note 82. 
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standards, require "balloting," or voting by the membership ofthe USG BC, 
to accept or reject the changes. Once the proposed change is ready for 
balloting, USGBC members receive an email notification and have thirty 
days in which to cast votes (each member organization receives one 
vote). 86 At least two-thirds of the votes cast must be affirmative in order 
for an action to pass.87 This process was used to create the version of the 
LEED standards that are the focus of the remainder ofthis Article, and that 
have been adopted in a number of municwal green building ordinances: 
LEED Version 2.2 for New Construction. 
C. What is LEED? 
The LEED process begins with a checklist.89 For a building to become a 
LEED-certified green building, its developer must obtain a certain number 
of "points" by incoq~orating design elements from the checklist into its 
development project.9°For new construction projects, points are awarded 
in five categories of human and environmental health. 9 Within each ofthe 
five areas, there are a number of "credits. " A given number of points are 
available within each credit, and it is entirely up to the developer to 
determine which mix of credits (and how many points within each credit) 
she wants to achieve so long as those points combine to add up to the 
minimum number of points required for certification. 92 
The LEED version 2.2 program, which was created through the 
86. LEED POIJCY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 25. Unlike the comment period, which is open 
to all interested parties, voting to approve a new standard is limited to USGBC members. LEED 
POLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 25. 
87 . A quorum of 10% of USGBC members is required. LEED PoLICY MANUAL, supra note 
65, at 25. 
88. On April27 , 2009, the USGBC launched a newLEED standard-LEED 2009. USGBC, 
FAQ, LEED Version 3, http ://www. usgbc. org/ ShowFile.aspx?DocumentiD=5733 (last visited Jan. 
24, 201 0). The newly-enacted LEED 2009, consisting of updates and revisions to the LEED Rating 
System, is combined with a revision of the LEED certification process and enhancements to LEED 
Online to constitute LEED Version 3 (LEED v3). USGBC, LEED 2009 VISION & EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY, http ://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentiD=4121 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010) 
[hereinafter USGBC, LEED 2009 VISION & EXECUIIVE SUMMARY]. This new LEED sys tem, 
however, "is not a 'tear down and rebuild' of the LEED that exists in the market but rather a 
reorganization of the existing LEED Rating Systems along with several key advancements." /d. 
89. For the LEED checklist for New Construction version 2.2, see LEED FOR NEW 
C ONSTRUCTION V 2.2, REGISTERED PROJECT CHECKllST, available at 
http: //www. usgbc. org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentiD=3998 [hereinafter LEED FOR NEW 
CONSTRUCTION V2.2, REGISTERED PROJECT CHECKLIST). 
90. See id. 
91. Those five categories are Sustainable Sites, Water Efficiency, Energy and Atmosphere, 
Materials and Resources, and Indoor Environmental Quality. Points may also be awarded for 
innovation and design process. See id. 
92. Points are totaled to determine what level of LEED certification a project can receive. !d. 
For new construction pursuant to LEED version 2.2, the certification levels include Platinum (the 
highest, which requires between 52 and 69 points), Gold (39 to 51 points), Silver (33 to 38 points), 
and Certified (26 to 32 points). See id. 
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USGBC methods described above, provides a mix of prescriptive 
standards and ~erformance-based points (though the former is much more 
predominant). 3 The Alternative Transportation Credit can be taken as an 
example of the credit and point system. Within LEED' s Sustainable Sites 
category, up to four points are available under the Alternative 
Transportation Credit for the incorporation of certain alternative 
transportation design measures into a project. 94 One point is available for 
"Public Transportation Access," meaning that a project is located within 
1/2 mile of an existing (or planned and funded) commuter rail, light rail, or 
subway station; or within 114 mile of at least one stop for at least two 
public or campus bus lines usable by occupants of the building. 95 A second 
Alternative Transportation point is available for "Bicycle Storage & 
Changing Rooms. "96 A commercial building can achieve this point by 
providing secure bicycle racks and/or storage within a certain distance 
from a building entrance for at least 5% ofall building users and providing 
showers and changing facilities for 0.5% of Full-Time Equivalent 
occupants.97 
D. LEED Certification 
The USGBC' s LEED certification program is quasi-judicial in nature: a 
developer seeking certification registers its project with the USGBC, 
presents documentation showing incorporation of various checklist 
elements, the USGBC makes a determination of compliance with those 
elements, 98 and there is an internal appeal process for those unhappy with 
93. Prescriptive standards are those that tell a developer what he or she must do and how to 
do it. Performance-based standards set an end goal, but leave the method of achieving that goal to 
the developer. See OFFICE OFMGMr. & BUDGET, supra note 80, at§ 3. 
94. Under the LEED for New Construction version 2.2 LEED Green Building rating system, 
these are Credits4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4. LEEDFORNEWCONSTRUCTIONV 2.2, REGISTERED PROJECT 
CHECKUST, supra note 89. 
95. LEED FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION & MAJOR RENOVATIONS, VERSION 2.2 , at 12 ( 2005), 
available at http :1lwww. usgbc. org/ ShowFile. aspx?DocumentiD= 1 095 (last visited Jan. 24, 201 0). 
This is an example of a prescriptive standard, because the developer is given a clear path to 
achieving this point. 
96. See id. at 13. 
97. See id. This is also a prescriptive standard. 
98. The USGBC has implemented new LEED standards, which went online in April 2009. 
See LEED PoucY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 25; supra note 88; see also LEED v3 ROlLOUT 1 
(2009), available at, https://www. usgbc.org/ ShowFile.aspx?DocumentiD=51 7 6. One of the major 
changes in the new version is that oversight of the certification process, which currently rests with 
the USGBC, will move to the Green Building Certification Institute and become compliant with the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO). See News Release, USGBC, Certification 
Bodies Announced for LEED Green Building Rating System (July 29, 2008), available at 
http://www. usgbc. org/Docs/News/CBs%20072908.pdf. Further, certification will actually be 
administered by independent, third-party certification bodies including ABS Quality Evaluations 
Inc., BSI Management Systems America Inc. , Bureau Veritas North America Inc., DNV 
Certification, Intertek, KEMA-Registered Quality Inc., Lloyd's Register Quality Assurance Inc., 
NSF-International Strategic Registrations, SRI Quality System Registrar Inc. and Underwriters 
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the determination.99 After registering with the USGBC, a developer must 
submit project plans for both the design and construction of the project. 
After completion of the design phase of the project, the USGBC reviews 
the submittals and marks each checklist credit as either anticipated, 
pending, or denied. 10°Certain credits will also be selected for auditing. 101 
Once the project has been constructed, USGBC will formally rule as to 
whether each credit has been "achieved" or "denied."102 The USGBC 
makes these determinations based on documentation submitted bl the 
project manager or LEED Accredited Professional on the project. 10 
The USGBC also has its own form of precedential decisions called 
Credit Interpretations Requests and Rulings (CIRs). 104 During design or 
construction of a project, a developer may be unsure whether a particular 
planned strategy will be sufficient to achieve a certain LEED credit. Thus, 
the developer may submit a Credit Interpretation Request, which a USGBC 
Technical Advisory Group will then consider and answer. 105 Interpretations 
determine whether a proposed action will satisfy the intent of the LEED 
credit requirement at issue, and thus enable the developer to achieve points 
under that credit. 106 
If after final certification review, a developer believes that it should 
Laboratories-DQS Inc. See id.; see also GreenerBuildings Staff, USGBC Lists Certification Lineup 
for LEED 2009, July 29, 2008, available at http://www. greener buildings. com/print/17754. 
99. See LEED POIJCY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 23-25 (detailing appeals process); see also 
Jonathan Riker, The Green Zone, L.A. LAWYER, Jan. 2008, at 33 (describing LEED as "a quasi­
legal process that involves the presentation of evidence by applicants, a compliance det=ination, 
and an internal appeals process"). 
100. LEED PoLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 22. The credits-and points under each 
credit-will not actually be granted until after the design phase is completed. GREEN BUILDING 
CERTIHCATION lNSTilUTE, POLICY MANUAL, http ://www. gbci. org/Display Page. aspx?CMSPageiD= 
156#Application_Review_Policies (last visited Jan. 24, 2010) [hereinafter GREEN BUILDING 
CERTIHCATION lNSTilUTE, POLICY MANUAL]. 
101. LEED POLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 22 ("[U]p to six prerequisites and/or credits 
shall be selected for audit."). 
102. See GREENBUilDINGCERTIFICATIONlNSTI1UTE, POLICY MANUAL, supra note 100. This is 
referred to as "Final Certification Review." LEED POLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 23. 
103. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (discussing LEED APs). 
104. LEED PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND MAlNIENANCEMANUAL, supra note 73, at 19. 
105. LEED PRODUCT DEVELOPMENTAND MAlNIENANCEMANUAL, supra note 73, at 19. "The 
Credit Interpretation Request (CIR) and ruling process was established for project applicants 
seeking technical and administrative guidance on how LEED credits apply to their projects and vice 
versa." U.S. GREEN BUilDING COUNCIL, GUIDELINES FOR CIR CUSTOMERS, available at 
http://www. usgbc. org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentiD=l51 0 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). 
106. The USGBC website maintains a database of former CIRs that is organized by credit and 
that can be searched to determine if a certain approach has already been questioned and analyzed. 
While they may provide guidance and information concerning an approach's applicability, CIRs do 
not ensure that points will actually be awarded. See LEED PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND 
MAINTENANCE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 19. 
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have been awarded a credit that the USGBC denied, 107 LEED has a built-in 
as-of-right appeals process called Appeal Review. 108 If the credit is again 
denied after the Appeal Review, a "Final Appeal" is available. 109 At the 
Final Appeal stage, there is also opportunity for an oral presentation of 
evidence via teleconference. 110 The reviewing committee makes a 
recommendation to the Management Subcommittee, who then issues a 
Final Appeal Review determination.lll That decision is final. 112 
E. 	 LEED as it Was Intended: The Normal Operation ofLEED as a 
Private Voluntary Market Mechanism 
The USGBC created LEED as a voluntary leadership standard. In other 
words, it was created as a marketing tool. A developer, interested in 
portraying herself and her development project as "green" or 
environmentally friendly, registers with the USGBC, pursues the level of 
certification that suits her marketing needs and desires, and then represents 
herself as the developer ofa "LEED Certified Green Building," evidenced 
by the LEED plaque that she places in the building's entryway. 
Developers pay for the privilege of seeking (and hopefully obtaining) 
LEED certification for a number of reasons. The benefits of green 
buildings are well-documented and numerous. 113 They include 
environmental benefits, such as improved water quality, enhanced water 
conservation, better indoor and outdoor air quality, fewer landfilled 
107. Because of the way the LEED system is currently structured, one point under a single 
credit can be the difference between a project that is Platinum certified (52-69 points) and one that 
is Gold certified (39-51 points), Gold and Silver (33-38 points), or Silver and Certified (26-32 
points). LEED FOR NEW CONS1RUCTION V 2. 2, REGISTERED PROJECT CHECKllST, supra note 89. 
108. See USGBC, Certification, http://www. usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageiD=l497 
(last visited Jan. 24, 201 0) [hereinafter USGBC, Certification]. A different review team than that 
which certified the project handles the appeal, which must be made within twenty-five days of the 
Final Certification Review determination. /d. Interestingly, USGBC staff does not perform credit 
review; it hires consultants who perform the actual review and award certification. LEED PoLICY 
MANUAL, supra note 65, at 23. "USGBC staff will assign the appeal review to one of the 
consultants under contract to perform LEED certification reviews (appeal reviews will always be 
handled by a consultant different than the consultant who conducted initial review)." !d. 
109. LEED POLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 23. The Management Subcommittee of the 
LEED Steering Committee assigns a review of the appeal to "the relevant Technical Advisory 
Group, the relevant Product Committee or to the Technical and Scientific Advisory Committee" 
depending on the issue that is being appealed. /d. at 23-24. 
110. !d. This is the only time that the developer may verbally discuss its appeal in a formal 
setting; all other communications are made through letter or email. !d. 
111. Id. at 24. 
112. /d. 
113. See, e.g., Circo, supra note 11, at 731-32 (citing social, political, environmental, and 
business benefits of green buildings); Kingsley, supra note 11, at 536-42 (discussing, briefly, social 
benefits of green building and noting that such benefits "are numerous and well established in the 
literature"). 
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materials than traditional construction, conservation of natural resources 
and building materials, and a general reduction in the many environmental 
externalities mentioned in the chart in Part I.B.2. 114 Green buildings also 
provide a number of purported economic benefits, especially to the end­
user. These include reduced operating costs due to lower bills for heating, 
electricity and water; increased emRloyee satisfaction and productivity; and 
the ability to charge more rent. 11 Studies also demonstrate that green 
buildings result in the improved health and comfort of building 
occupants. 116 Thus, a developer who "purchases" LEED certification is 
able to sell that brand to the building's tenants, purchaser, and financiers. 
As a market-force-based product, LEED's checklist system makes 
sense. It allows a developer to internalize its cost-benefit analysis; 
determine what level of certification it wants to pursue (if it wants to 
pursue certification at all); and then decide how, through a combination of 
points, it wishes to achieve that certification level. Similarly, the USGBC' s 
administrative processes 117 are appropriate and legitimate in the context 
for which they were created: LEED as a market-based mechanism. 
Specifically, the process provides an opportunity for developers who are 
interested in green building, and more pointedly, who are interested in 
seeking LEED certification, to join the USGBC and participate in the 
standards-creation and adoption process. Thus, they have an incentive to 
participate, notice and an awareness of the process, and an opportunity for 
voice. Importantly, they also have a complete opportunity for exit if they 
disagree with the final form of the standards thatthe USGBC promulgates 
because they can choose not to seek LEED certification for their building. 
As discussed below, this opportunity for exit is a key distinction that is lost 
in the translation of LEED from a private voluntary standard to a public 
mandatory one. 
F. Making LEED Standards Mandatory 
Because buildings contribute so substantially to environmental 
problems, including global concerns like climate change and local 
concerns like stream and air quality, a number of cities have focused their 
attention on regulating building construction and demolition as a way to 
improve environmental conditions. In many cities, green building 
requirements were originally only imposed on publicly-financed or 
municipal buildings. 118 Cities thought that if they were to lead by example 
114. See A Sample of Building-Related Environmental Externalities Chart, supra Part II. B. 2.; 
see also U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Why Build Green?, http ://www.epa.gov/greenbuilding/pubs/ 
whybuild.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). 
115. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 114. 
116. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 114. 
117. See supra Part II. B. 
118. See, e.g. , POR1LAND, OR., REs. No. 35956 (2001) (Jan. 10, 2001) , available at 
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and construct financially-feasible, successful, well-occupied green 
buildings, private developers might follow suit. In other locales , developers 
were given incentives such as fast-tracked permitting if they included green 
building elements in their project designs. 119 However, many cities have 
now decided that affirmative requirements are needed to effect real change 
in the building industry, and thus also have extended green building 
requirements to private developers, for private projects. 120 
Cities have begun to incorporate or refer to the LEED standards in their 
municipal codes (such as zoning, planning, or building codes). Some cities 
actually require developers to register with the USGBC and achieve a 
specific number of checklist points prior to the issuance of a building 
permit, certificate of occupancy, or other milestone. 121 Other cities only 
require proof of certifiability prior to the issuance of a permit. 122 Even in 
http: //www. portlandonline. com/auditor/index. cfm ?a=543 55&c=34835 (reflecting adoption of 
Green Building Policy); PORTIAND, OR., REs. No. 36310 (Apr. 27, 2005), available at 
http: //www.portlandonline.com/sharedlcfm/image.cfm?id=204110 (reflecting adoption of updated 
Green Building Policy); SEATIIE, WA., REs. No . 30121 (Feb. 22, 2000), available at 
http:/ /clerk. ci. seattle. wa. us/~scripts/nph-brs. exe?sl=&s2=&s3=30 121 &s4=&Sect4=AND&l=20& 
Sectl=IMAGE&Sect2=THESON&Sect3=PLURON&Sect5=RESNl&Sect6=HITOFF&d=RESN 
&p=1 &u=%2F% 7Epublic%2Fresn l.htm&r= 1 &f=G (reflecting adoption of Sustainable Building 
Policy). 
119. SAN FRANCISCO PLANNING DEPARTMENT, Pl..ANNrNG DEPARTMENT APPliCATION 
PROCESSING GUIDELINES, DIRECTOR" S BUlLETIN No. 2006-02 (2006), available at 
http :1/library. municode. com/index. aspx?clientld= 16754&stateld=20 &stateName=Maryland (stating 
that building projects that meet or exceed a LEED Gold Rating are deemed "Type 1" projects, 
which have a targeted timeline of initial review within two weeks, versus "Type 4" projects, which 
are entitled to no special procedures or timelines and may be considered out of order). 
120. See, e.g., ANNAPOUS, MD., MUN. CODE, tit. 17, ch. 17 .14 (2009), available at 
http: //municipalcodes.lexisnexis.com/codes/annapolis/ (requiring LEED certification for all 
applications for new construction or major modifications to public buildings, single family 
dwellings, and certain residential, non-residential, and commercial buildings); CALABASAS, CAL, 
MUN. CODE, tit. 17, ch. 17 .34 (2009), available at http ://www.municode.com/resources/gateway. asp 
?pid=l6235&sid=5 (adopting LEED v2.0 for "establishment, construction or replacement of 
privately-owned and city-owned, non-residential structures over five hundred (500) square feet;" 
requiring structures up to five thousand square feet to achieve LEED Certified rating and structures 
over five thousand square feet to achieve LEED Silver rating); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL, BUILDING 
CODE ch. 13C, § 1303C (2009), available at http ://www.amlegal.com/nxtlg ateway.dll?f=templates 
&fn=default.htm&vid=amlegal:sf_building (requiring LEED certification for all residential and 
commercial buildings in the City). These ordinances vary in form, but most apply to new 
commercial construction over a certain square footage. Some also apply to residential projects. 
121. See, e.g., POR1LAND, OR., REs. No. 35956 (2001) (Jan. 10, 2001), available at 
http: //www. p ortlandonline. com/shared/cfm/image. cfm ?id=2113 52; POR1LAND, OR. , REs. No. 3 631 0 
(Apr. 27, 2005), available at http: //www.portlandonline.com/shared/cfm/image.cfm?id=ll2682. 
This express delegation, requiring developers not only to comply with the LEED standards but 
allowing the USGBC to determine whether the developer has complied with those standards, 
appears to be an improper delegation oflegislative authority. It also raises questions as to whether 
the USGBC can be considered a state actor. While these are very important questions, they are 
beyond the scope of this Article, and will not be discussed further. 
122. As will be discussed in more detail later in this Article, municipalities are just beginning 
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these cities that only require a developer to demonstrate that its project 
could obtain LEED certification, were it to register with the USGBC, a 
target compliance level is typically set by the city. For example, the City of 
Rohnert Park, California allows new private commercial construction 
projects over 20,000 square feet to "self-certify, "123 but requires that they 
demonstrate to a city building official that the~ have achieved enough 
points to reach LEED Silver level certification. 1 4 
G. Why the Current Trend Makes Some Sense: The Benefits of Using 
an Existing Private Framework Instead of Creating a New One 
From an economic and resource preservation perspective, it is easy to 
understand why municipalities are beginning to require private developers 
to comply with the existing LEED framework, as opposed to creating their 
own municipal green building standards or even incorporating the text of 
the LEED standards into their own codes. 125 
Private standards are often used to develop public regulations. 126 For 
example, the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act 
(NTTAA) requires federal agencies to adopt existing private sector 
to require (as opposed to encourage or reward) private developers to build green. Of those who have 
taken this step , almost all require compliance with the LEED standards. See BoSTON, MA.. ZoNING 
CODE art. 37 (2009), available at http: //www.bostonredevelopmentauthority.org/zoning/downlo 
adZone.asp; D.C. MUN. REGs. tit 6, § 6-1451.01 (2009), available at http ://govemment. westlaw. 
com/linkedslice/default.asp?SP=DCC-1 000. Further, registration with the USGBC and pursuit of 
certification is required by some. See PASADENA, CAL, MUN. CODE tit, 14, § 14.90.050(A)(l) 
(2009), available at http ://www.municode. com/resources/gateway. asp?pid=l6551 &sid=5; TOWNOF 
BABYLON, N.Y., CODE ch. 89, art. VIII, § 89-86 (2009), available at 
http://www.ecode360. com/?custld=BA0924. However, most of these fledgling ordinances do not 
require the developer to actually obtain certification from the USGBC in order for building permits 
to be issued; rather, most provide that the developer must only show that she could achieve a 
specific level of certification if the project were to be registered with the USGBC and she pursued 
certification. See Edna Sussman, Reshaping Municipal and County Laws to Foster GreenBuililing, 
Energy Efficiency, and Renewable Energy, 16 N.Y. U. ENVTL L.J. 1, 10-12 (2008). Others require 
certification, but provide that it can be by an "equivalent" third-party certifier approved by the 
municipality's building director or other official. One reason for this is that the USGBC does not 
formally LEED certify a building until it has been constructed, whereas most green building 
ordinances require compliance with the LEED standards prior to the issuance of a building permit. 
123. Self-certified means that a project sponsor has "submitted compliance documentation to 
the green building compliance official [a city building official] certifying that the project has met 
the standards specified in the [LEED] guidelines and has attained the compliance threshold ... set 
forth by city council resolution." ROHNERT PARK, CAL. MUN. CODE tit. 14, § 14.50.020 (2009), 
available at http://www. municode. com/resources/ gateway. asp?pid= 16586&sid=5. 
124. RoHNERT PARK, CAL, Res. 2007-09 (Feb. 27, 2007), available at http://www.ci.rohnert­
park. ca.us/Modules/ ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=426 (reflecting adoption of Green Building 
standards). 
125. Sussman, supra note 122, at 10; Regulatory Scenarios Chart, infra Part V.B. 
126. Jason Morrison & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Private and Quasi-Private Standard Setting, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 498, 520 (Daniel Bodansky, 
Jutta Brunnee, Ellen Hey eds. , 2007) ("[G]ovemment agencies have for decades actively supported 
the integration of voluntary consensus standards into their [local] policies and activities."). 
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consensus standards whenever possible instead of creating in-house, non­
consensus standards. 127 A memorandum addressing Federal Participation 
in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in 
Conformity Assessment Activities 128 suggests that existing standards 
should be used for a number of reasons, including: (a) to eliminate costs 
associated with development of new standards; (b) to encourage standards 
that serve national needs; and (c) to work toward harmonization of 
standards. However, neither the NTTAA itself nor the memorandum 
addresses the deeper issue of whether publicly created standards provide 
benefits not present with privately created standards. 
A more specific example of private voluntary standards finding their 
way into mandates is that of the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO). ISO itself is a non-governmental organization that 
develops standards in a wide range of areas , including product 
specifications, health and safety, and the environment. 129 Although these 
private standards are presumptively voluntary, many countries have 
adopted them as national standards, and many ISO standards have become 
market requirements. 13°For example, pursuant to a new rule, all steel 
containers that arrive in the United States must be sealed so as to comply 
with the ISO Publicly Available Specification 17712 (ISO/PAS 17712), 
Freight Containers-Mechanical Seals standards. 131 This ISO standard 
avoids the need for the government to create its own high-security seal 
specifications. 
This approach of applying an existing system is tempting for 
municipalities considering adoption ofa green building ordinance as well. 
In many smaller cities or counties, a planning department may comprise 
one or two planners and a director of development, but the building 
department might have a plan checker and a building inspector. 132 It is 
somewhat infeasible to expect these few individuals, who often already 
127. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L No. 104-113, §12 , 
110 Stat. 77 5, 782-83 (1996). However, the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act 
(NTTAA) does not apply to state or local governments. !d. 
128. 0FFICEOFMGMT. &BUDGET, supranote80, at§ 1. 
129. International Organization for Standardization, About ISO, http ://www.iso.org/iso/about. 
htm (last visited Jan. 24, 201 0). 
130. Morrison & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 126, at 511. 
131. Container Seals on Maritime Cargo, 7 3 Fed. Reg. 46029 (Aug. 7 , 2008). 
132. See, e.g., Peter Barnes, Valley Planners Overworked: Understaffing Results in Longer 
Waits for Permits, THE SPOKESMAN-REViEW, Mar. 10, 2007, available at 
http://www. spokesmanreview. com/tools/story _pf. asp?ID= 178544 ("Currently, a staff ofjust seven 
people is laying out the future of Spokane Valley. Some of the planning work overlaps with the 
building department, which employs about 15 people."). However, some commentators have noted 
that the failure of a local government to allocate enough resources to handle these inherently local 
environmental externalities is a local problem, and relying on a national system is not the solution. 
Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 48. 
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have very busy schedules and heavy workloads, to become knowledgeable 
enough about green building processes such that they could create and 
enforce a standard. 133 Even in larger municipalities, expecting a worker to 
add an entirely new area of knowledge to her daily tasks is difficult, and 
hiring additional employees is often not possible due to budget 
restrictions. 134 Further, using an established system allows a municipality's 
green building program to get up and running sooner than it otherwise 
would, especially in the case of LEED, as many developers are already 
familiar with the LEED standards. 135 
Another benefit of using an existing system such as LEED is that those 
creating the standards and administering the program are "experts. " 136 
Most city planners and building inspectors lack the expertise and 
experience in green building that a LEED-Accredited architect or engineer 
sitting on one of the USGBC standards committees has. Therefore, it 
makes sense that the standards promulgated by those experts would likely 
be more comprehensive and targeted than some created by city staff. 137 
Notwithstanding, it is indisputable that some planners and building 
inspectors, especially those in larger, progressive cities, have experience 
with green building design. For years, some cities have required some sort 
of "green" construction as either a condition of project approval or as a 
133. "[T]he Board of Supervisors recognizes that the adoption of new standards without 
additional education and training for County staff responsible for enforcement of the standards can 
diminish compliance and potentially undermine the efficacy of this ordinance."' MARIN Co., CAL, 
ORD. No. 3492 (June 3, 2008), available at http :1/www. co. marin. ca.us/depts/B S/Main/BOSagmn/or 
dinances/ord-3492.pdf (codified at MARIN Co., CALCODE tit. 19, § 19.04.100 (2009)).The 
counterpoint to this argument is, of course, that smaller cities will likely have fewer permit 
applicants, and thus the staff might be able to find the time to take on this additional task. Similarly, 
a number of cities, big and small, have adopted green building ordinances that place compliance 
determination responsibilities on city staff. See, e.g. , AlAMEDA, CAL, MUN. CODE tit 13, § 13-19.4 
(2009), available at http ://www.ci.alameda.ca. us/gov /municipal_code.html (requiring designation 
of a Green Building Compliance Official charged with "the responsibility to administer and monitor 
compliance with the [City's] green building requirements"). 
134. But see Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE LJ. 389,405 
(2003 ) ("Although relying on private actors can save the government money, this choice can also 
increase the government's transaction costs when a transaction involves significant opportunistic 
behavior, incomplete contracting, and hold-up problems."). 
135. "To enable rapid implementation, industry-established means and methods are 
employed." MAYOR'S TASK FORCE REPORT, SAN FRANCISCO, supra note 6, at Exec. Summary 1. 
136. David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise ofGovernmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 656-57 
(1986). 
137. Such use of non-governmental experts has been recognized and supported by the Supreme 
Court, and thus is not inherently improper. See A. L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 
U.S. 495, 53 7 (1935) (stating Congress may seek private assistance in "matters of a more or less 
technical nature"). But see Daniel Bodansky, Legitimacy in OxFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 704, 720 (Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnee, Ellen Hey eds., 2007) ("Yet 
technical expertise is rarely a sufficient basis for environmental decision-making. Most problems 
involve issues not simply of fact but also of policy and value."). 
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138
mitigation measure for other environmental impacts. Thus, it would not 
be completely outside the realm of their experience and expertise to have 
certain planners and inspectors act as administrators and enforcers of these 
programs. Indeed, as noted above, many cities that now require private 
compliance with LEED standards do not rely on the USGBC to enforce the 
program. 139 Rather, some of these cities have the building inspector, or a 
newly designated employee confirm that the attempted LEED checklist 
points could likely be obtained if the project were to seek certification from 
140the USGBC. 
While the benefits of using an existing system, such as LEED, are 
certainly real, they do not outweigh the clear legitimacy-related benefits 
that a publicly promulgated system provides, including a democratic, 
transparent process that supplies interested parties with notice and an 
opportunity for voice and exit. Nor do they outweigh the stronger 
environmental benefits that result from a locally, publicly derived set of 
141
standards. 
IV. REGIME DESIGN GOALS AND POSSIBILITIES: EFFICACY, LEGITIMATE 
13 8. See, e.g. , California Environmental Quality Act, CAL PuB. REs. CODE§§ 21000-211 77 
(2009 ), available at http:/ /online. sfsu. edu/~mgriffin/CEQA%20CA %20PRC%2021 000-211 7 7. pdf 
(requiring public agencies to prepare environmental impact reports (EIRs) for specified projects 
indicating whether the project" s environmental impact will be positive or negative and requiring the 
agency to attempt to mitigate harmful environmental effects to the extent possible). For an example 
of an EIR that incorporates green building-related mitigation measures, see UNIV. OF CAL, 
CERTIFICATION OF THE FiNAL EIR, FINDiNGS, AND APPROVAL OF Tiffi UNIVERSITY OF CALIRJRNIA 
SANTA CRUZ 2005 LONG RANGE DEVELOPMENT PLAN, available at 
http://www. universityofcalifornia. edulregents/regmeet/sept06!102attach8. pdf. Various mitigation 
measures can be found in this report, including requiring lighting for new projects to be compliant 
with the UC Regents' Green Building Policies and requiring design measure to maximize 
infiltration and dissipation of runoff, including permeable pavement and green roofs. See id. at 9. 
139. ROHNERT PARK, CAL, MUN. CODE tit. 14, § 14.50.100 (2009), available at 
http: I l www. municode. com/resources/gateway. asp ?pid= 165 86&sid= 5. 
140. See, e.g., PASADENA, CAL, MUN. CoDE, tit. 14, § 14.90.060 (2009), available at 
http: //www.municode.com/resources/gateway.asp?pid=l655l&sid= 5. 
141. Further, reliance on private standard-setting organizations to promulgate governmental 
regulations is generally frowned upon in the literature on the subject. See Michael T. Mishkin & 
David I. Adelman, Gas Industry Standards Board: Legal Considerations in the Standard Setting 
Process, 15 ENFRGY L.J. 73, 77 (1994) (discussing Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's 
adoption of private standards, and noting that "in the absence of express Congressional 
authorization to delegate responsibilities to non-governmental bodies, concerns about abuse of 
power arising from an agency's delegation of authority to a private body would seem to make such 
delegations susceptible to challenge"); Shapiro, supra note 134, at 406 (" Reliance on private 
standard-setting organizations does not appear to be justified for most types of regulatory 
standards."). Notably, many cities have adopted building codes that were created by the 
International Code Council-a private entity. Those codes are vulnerable to many of the same 
objections raised in this Article. However, a salient difference between the status of public 
adoption ofbuilding codes and ISO standards on one hand, and adoption ofLEED standards on the 
other, is that the former happened years ago, and commentators now recognize the problems 
resulting from that model of adoption, whereas the adoption of LEED standards is happening in the 
present; it is not yet a cemented practice. Thus, cities should learn from the problems and concerns 
that have accompanied adoption of other forms of private standards, and perhaps take a different 
path forward with respect to creation of green building ordinances. 
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PROCESS, AND GREEN BUILDING ORDINANCE SCENARIOS 
A. Regime Design 
Whenever a new regime or regulatory system is being designed, it is 
important to look beyond the status quo and determine how the system can 
be best crafted. It is also necessary to consider what the goals of that 
regime should be. I propose that there are two primacy considerations or 
goals for any ordinance requiring private developers to construct green 
buildings. First is the goal of efficacy: ensuring that governments require 
environmentally sensitive, sustainable buildings that will effectively reduce 
local, negative externalities and combat climate change, so long as those 
buildings are cost-effective and feasible from a financial and physical 
construction standpoint. The second goal is that of legitimate process: 
ensuring processes that meet various criteria of transparency, democracy, 
notice, and an opportunity for voice and exit, and that are not dominated or 
dictated by the regulated industry. These goals cannot be accomplished via 
local adoption of a privately promulgated, nationally uniform, voluntary 
standard such as LEED. Rather, achieving these two goals requires 
individualized, locally created green building standards that are developed 
and enforced by public bodies, taking into account the needs and concerns 
of their specific localities. 142 A uniform system that is promulgated on a 
national level, or one that is promulgated or enforced by a private, building 
industry-controlled entity, will not sufficiently achieve either goal. 
B. 	Public Versus Private Regimes: Different Possible Regulatory 
Scenarios 
Green building regimes can be divided into six basic categories or 
scenarios. Under the first scenario, the local government (e.g., the city 
attorney or county counsel, in conjunction with the commissioners) 
promulgates an ordinance, which is adopted through a public hearing 
process. That ordinance is then enforced by the local government's code 
enforcement division, police force, or similar local department; 143 this is a 
"purely governmental" regime. 
The second scenario involves wholesale governmental importation into 
its local code of standards that have been written by private entities. 144 In 
this scenario, local governments review the text of the regulations or 
142. Of course, private standards can and should serve to inform locally developed green 
building standards. 
143. See Shapiro, supra note 134, at 400 (discussing the "traditional model," wherein a federal 
agency writes a standard, adopts it via notice and co=entrulemaking, and then enforces it through 
adjudication and remedy determination s). 
144. See Shapiro, supra note 134, at 400 (referring to this as a form of contractual standard 
setting). 
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standards that have been promulgated by a private entity and then 
reproduce the text of those standards in their code. Under this "wholesale 
importation" approach, some local governments might slightly modify the 
text of the private standards to suit local needs. The local government itself 
then enforces these standards. 
Under the third scenario, the government does not actually import the 
text of the privately promulgated standards into its code, but rather adopts 
an ordinance that references those third-party standards and requires 
compliance with them. This "incorporation by reference" regime can take 
one of two forms-a Scenario 3a "fixed import" model, where a 
government refers to a then-existing set of standards (e. g., applying LEED 
version 2.2, "which is in effect on the date of the adoption of this 
") 145d. or scenano 3b ble . " mo e , where aor mance , a . " muta Import d 1 
government references the existing version of the standard and anyJ,uture 
version that may be passed and adopted by the promulgating entity. 46 The 
local government would enforce the Scenario 3 ordinances. 
Scenarios four through six mirror scenarios one through three, but a 
private entity, instead of the government, makes the determination of 
compliance with the standards. Thus, the fourth scenario is that a local 
government promulgates its own regulations, but then contracts with a 
private entity to enforce them. 147 Under the fifth scenario, the standards are 
promulgated by the private entity, are imported into the local government's 
code, and are then enforced by the private entity. Similarly, under the sixth 
scenario (which also has subparts a and b), compliance is expressly 
required by reference to the private standards (fixed or mutable), and the 
standards are then enforced by the private entity. 148 Both the fifth and sixth 
approaches are pure industry self-regulation, although the fifth scenario, 
145. See, e.g., CALABASAS, CAL, MUN. CODE tit. 17, § 17.34.010 (2009), available at 
http: / /municode. com/resources/gateway. asp?pid= 1623 5&sid=5 ("The Calabasas-LEED system is 
the United States Green Building Council's LEED Rating System Version 2.0."). 
146. See, e.g., PASADENA, CAL, MUN. CODE tit. 14, § 14.90.030 (2009), available at 
http://www.municode.com/resources/gateway. asp?pid=l6551 &sid=5 (" 'LEED' s Green Building 
Rating System (Rating System)' means the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design Green 
Building Rating System approved by the United States Green Building Council (USGBC) and as 
that Rating System may be amendedfrom time to time by the USGBC.") (emphasis added). This is 
an example of a Scenario 3b mutable import ordinance. 
147. Shapiro, supra note 134, at 400. For example, a city could create its own green building 
code, but feeling that its staff was too small or lacked expertise, could hire a third party certification 
organization to determine whether builders were in fact complying with the ordinance. This 
scenario is not currently being used in the green building ordinance arena, and thus will not be 
discussed further. 
148. See, e.g., BoSTON, MA, ZONiNG CODE § 37 -5 (2009), available at 
http: //www. bostonredevelopmentauthority. org/zoning/downloadZone. asp (adopting LEED 
standards, requiring applicants to submit a completed LEED scorecard and "certification from a 
LEED Accredited Professional and/or other expert recognized by the Boston Redevelopment 
Authority"). 
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wherein the local government has the option of revising the private 
standards to suit its local needs, is somewhat less troublesome. 149 
Regulatory Scenarios 
Local Government 
Promulgates 
Standards 
Private Entity 
Promulgates Standards 
Local Government Importation 
Reference to private standards in 
Code (Scenario 3) 
Compliance 
Determination150 
Scenario 1 into Local Code 
(Scenario 2) 
Fixed Import 
(Scenario 3a) 
Mutable Import 
(Scenario 3b) 
Private Entity 
Compliance 
Determination 
Scenario 4 
Importation 
into Local Code 
(Scenario 5) 
Reference to private standards in 
Code (Scenario 6) 
Fixed Import 
(Scenario 6a) 
Mutable Import 
(Scenario 6b) 
In the privately-applicable green building ordinance sector, Scenarios 2 
and 3 are most common and Scenarios 5 and 6 less common. Scenario 1, 
however, would be most appropriate from both an efficacy and legitimate 
process standpoint. Scenarios 2 and 3 lack the level of legitimacy that 
inheres in Scenario 1 ordinances, 151 but these are not so troubling from an 
efficacy perspective, so long as the private industry promulgating the 
standards is not the same industry that they set out to regulate (e.g., 
buildings and development). 152 
The incorporation ofprivate standards into local government codes and 
regulations is not entirely new, but it is in this format, where the 
promulgating agency is often also tasked with enforcing the code it has 
drafted. For example, the town of Babylon, New York, has adopted a 
Scenario 6b ordinance. 153 With respect to a compliance determination, the 
149. Shapiro, supra note 134, at 400. 
150. The enforcement here is referred to as a "compliance determination." As has been 
mentioned elsewhere in this article, see supra Part III. D., green building ordinances typically 
require developers to submit evidence that they would be eligible for LEED certification were they 
to register with the USGBC and seek certification. However, because that determination must be 
made in order to issue building permits or certificates of occupancy, it must be made prior to 
completion of the project (the USGBC makes its compliance determination after construction of a 
project). Therefore, this Article uses the term "compliance determination" instead of enforcement, 
because it is merely a determination that a project could, or will, be certified by LEED upon 
completion. 
151. Legitimate process issues are addressed infra Part VI. 
152. While enforcement by the same industry organization that created a standard raises a 
number of legal concerns, those will not be addressed in this Article. 
153. BABYLON, N.Y., CoDE§ 89-84 (2008), available at http ://www. ecode360.com/?custld= 
BA0924 (The Town of Babylon "hereby adopts, in principle, the [USGBC' s] ... Leadership in 
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Babylon ordinance requires that a project actually achieve certification 
from the USGBC. 154 
This is a different scenario than one referring to private codes that will 
then be publicly enforced. For example, the City of Pasadena, California, 
has adopted a Scenario 3b green building ordinance that requires private 
developers to comply with LEED standards. 155 However, that ordinance 
tasks Pasadena's plannin9 director (or her designee) with making a 
compliance determination. 56 Regardless of the enforcement mechanism 
used, jurisdictions with ordinances following Scenarios 3 or 6 will fail to 
successfully fulfill the green building regime goal of a legitimate process. 
V. 	EFACACY AND THE CONTENT OF LEED-BASED GREEN BUILDING 
ORDINANCES 
The first goal of a green building regime is efficacy. When 
municipalities determine what type of green building mandate to impose, 
they should balance costs. However, they also should ensure that the 
resulting green building will include enough authentic green elements so as 
to successfully reduce key local environmental externalities caused by 
buildings, and in the aggregate, combat global warming. The current trend 
of municipalities importing or referring to LEED standards in their codes 
as the benchmark for green buildings will not achieve the regime goal of 
efficacy. 
A. 	LEED Is a National Approach, But a Local Approach Will More 
Successfully Achieve the Goal ofEfficacy 
Despite the arguments in favor of a national or international regulatory 
scheme for combating climate change generally, there is at least a strong 
argument that green building regulations should be promulgated at the 
Energy and Environmental Design for New Construction (LEED-NC) Rating System, Version 2.2, 
and, further, automatically adopts any future versions promulgated by the USGBC."). 
154. !d. §89-86(C), available at http: //www.ecode360.com/?custid=BA0924. However, "a 
temporary Certificate of Occupancy may be issued until proof of [LEED] Certification is achieved. 
Prior to a temporary Certificate of Occupancy being issued, the applicant shall pay afee to ensure 
successful completion of the Certification .... If the developer achieves Certification status, thefee 
paid shall be refunded." !d. §89-87, available at http ://www.brookhaven. org/DesktopModulesiBri 
ng2mind/DMX/Download. aspx?Tabid= 134&DMXMobule=1576&Command=Core_Download& 
Entryid=987&Portalld=0. 
155. PASADENA, CAL, MUN. CODE§ 14.90.050(A) (2008) ("The city shall adopt by reference 
the [USGBC] LEED™ ... Green Building Rating System as the standard for which aproject shall 
be measured as agreen building."). 
156. "The [planning director] shall: A. Verify LEED™ project registration and review the 
required LEEDTM checklist and supporting documentation prior to issuance of a grading or 
building permit. B. Verify that the building measures and provisions indicated on the project 
LEEDTM checklist ... are being implemented at foundation inspection, framing inspection, and 
prior to issuance of afinal certificate of occupancy." !d.§ 14.90.060(A)-(B). 
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locallevel. 157 This approach comports with the general notion that land use 
regulation (of which green building regulation is certainly a subset) is an 
area of the law that is traditionally reserved to local governments. 
Thus far , green building regulations have been at once both national 
and local in application. At the most general level, the LEED certification 
program promulgated by the USGBC is a national-level program: the 
standards are issued by a single entity located in Washington, D.C. ;158 there 
is a sin~,le system of credits that applies regardless of a project's 
location; 59 and the LEED-Accredited Professionals who administer much 
of the program take a single, national accreditation examination. 160 On the 
other hand, adoption of LEED standards and their imposition on private 
developers have taken place at a wholly local level. 161 
A regionally focused set of green building standards, however, will 
more successfully address local environmental concerns than would a 
nationally created set of standards such as LEED. 162 Throughout history, 
157. See supra Part II.B.2. 
158. See U.S. Green Building Council, About USGBC, http ://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage. 
aspx?CMSPageiD=l24 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). 
159. LEED does provide different slightly different credit rating systems based on the type of 
project at issue and the type of LEED certification that is sought (e. g., new construction versus 
neighborhood development versus schools). 
160. See Green Building Certification Institute, About GBCI, http ://www.gbci.org /Display 
Page.aspx?CMSPageiD=l9 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). 
161. See USGBC, LEED, LEED Rating Systems http ://www.usgbc. org/DisplayPage.aspx?C 
MSPageiD=222 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). Certain federal agencies have adopted LEED 
requirements for their own construction projects, including the Departments of Defense, 
Agriculture, Energy, and State. !d. All new construction projects overseen by the U.S. General 
Services Administration, which manages a number of federal buildings, must be LEED certified. 
U.S. General Services Administration, Sustainable Design Program, 
http: //www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/contentView.do?contentld=8154&contentType=GSA_OVERV 
lEW (last visited Jan. 24, 20 10). Similarly, a number of states and local governments require that all 
new government buildings obtain LEED certification. Buildings, America's Cities 'Leed' the Way, 
May 2005 , http ://www. buildings. com/ ArticleDetails/tabid/33 211ArticleiD/247 5/Default. aspx (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2010). However, no state or federal agency as of yet requires private compliance 
with LEED standards-only local governments have taken this step. 
In July 2008, the California Building Standards Connission, which oversees adoption and 
implementation of building codes in California, adopted the California Green Building Standards 
Code. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 24., pt. 11 (2008) , available at http: //www. documents. dgs. ca.gov/ 
bsc/2009/partll_2008_calgreen_code.pdf. The standards apply to commercial and residential 
construction in both the public and private sectors. Id. § 1 01.3. Although currently voluntary, some 
elements of the Code are expected to become mandatory in 2010. See Michelle L. Moore, et al., 
California Green Building Code Update: Coming to a Location Near You, l.EGALUPDATES & NEWS 
(Morrison Foerster, LLP), Aug., 2009, at 1-2, available at http ://www.mofo.com/news/updates/ 
files/15827.html (last visited Jan. 24, 201 0). Of note, the Code does not mention or rely on LEED 
standards, but instead creates its own green building requirements and checklist. See CAL CODE 
REGS. tit. 24., pt. 11. 
162. Further, as some commentators have noted, individual actors' efforts to decrease 
greenhouse gas emissions are not presumptively irrational. Engel & Saleska, supra note 7 , at 207­
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citizens have often relied on local governments to take action before the 
federal government has done so, 163 and green building ordinances are no 
exception; local governments, in the face of inaction and lack ofconsensus 
by the federal government, are the ones that are actually making strides in 
the effort to reduce both local environmental externalities and the impacts 
of global warming. 164 
1. LEED Points Are Not Regionally Weighted 
A primary reason that a local approach to green building makes more 
sense than a national or international one is that flexibility in the 
application of regulations is important for efficaciously addressing regional 
environmental concerns and differences. Unlike federal or even state-level 
law, local governments need room for variation based on their unique 
localities and externalities. 165 However, local governments cannot maintain 
this flexibility while using the rigid and inflexible LEED standards, 166 
which impose LEED's "checklist" format and its "one-size-fits all" 
solution. 161 
LEED' s failure to account for regional differences embodies this rigid, 
one-size-fits all approach. For example, water protection measures that are 
implemented on a project in an area like Seattle, Washington, which has a 
wet climate and abundant rainfall, result in the same number of LEED 
09 (pointing to economic studies that indicate that "a significant fraction of the emissions 
reductions that are needed to achieve efficient levels should be made unilaterally by countries acting 
in their own, rational self-interest"). 
163. For example, only state and local governments had been involved with organic food 
standards prior to the passage of the Organic Foods Production Act in the 1990 Farm Bill. See 
generally U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Agriculture, Organic Farming, 
http: //www. epa. gov/oecaagct/torg.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2010) (discussing the history oforganic 
agricultural production and the development of national standards). Then, in 1992, the United 
States Department ofAgriculture appointed the National Organic Standards Board and established 
the National Organic Program. United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing 
Service, National Organic Program, http ://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv 1.0/nosb (last visited Jan. 24, 
2010). 
164. Engel & Saleska, supra note 7 , at 186 ("[S]tate and local governments are taking action 
on climate change despite the United States' decision not to participate in an international climate 
change agreement establishing fixed emissions reduction targets."). 
165. Circo, supra note 11, at 778. 
166. See Charles J. Kibert & Kevin Grosskopf, Envisioning Next-Generation Green Buildings, 
23 J. LAND UsE & ENVTL L. 145, 150 (2007) (criticizing then-current version of LEED as being 
"rigid with respect to points, categories, and ratings and ... is considered a 'one size fits all' 
approach to green building assessment"); Judith Lewis, LEEDing the Pack: Why Our Green 
Standards Might not be Green Enough, L.A. WEEKLY , Sept. 14, 2006, available at 
http://www.laweekly.com/2006-09-14/newslleeding-the-pack/l (citing criticisms regarding the 
LEED system, including that the point system "makes some of its criteria meaningless" and "does 
not vary by region or climate"). 
167 . Transcript: Proving a Building 'Green' Can Be Daunting (Nat'l Pub. Radio May 7, 2008), 
available at http: I lwww. npr. org/templates/transcri p t/transcript. php ?story Id=902 5993 5. 
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points as those measures implemented on a project in the desert where 
water conservation is a much greater need. Similarly, a project that installs 
a green roof in an area with heavy rains, polluted rivers and streams caused 
by stormwater runoff, and heat island effect problems168 is eligible for the 
same LEED points from the green roof as a project in a suburban area with 
none of these problems. Additionally, while points are given for using 
regional materials, those points are not weighted differently based on a 
169 Thf '. ' ack or a undance o certam. matena s. .reg10n s 1 b . 1 e pomt system s 
failure to account for regional differences demonstrates the problems with 
a national approach to green building and with the current municipal 
adoption trend. Iflocal governments were to instead create their own green 
building ordinances, or were to use LEED as the basis ofa code but modify 
it to suit their local needs, they could target regional concerns and make a 
greater number of points available for those "green" elements that would 
most directly target their local environmental externalities. 
2. Modification of LEED for Local Purposes Is Cumbersome 
Many ofthe local governments that have adopted private green buildin.fi 
ordinances have expressly referenced170 or incorporated wholesale1 
LEED Version 2.2 into their codes. However, because the USGBC claims 
that it "recognizes that LEED needs to be adaptable to meet the different 
needs of different markets in different locations," LEED does provide a 
mechanism for altering its standards if local governments choose to do 
so. 172 Currently, LEED provides for "supplement[ation]" or "adaptation[]" 
by local governments implementing LEED. 173 
168. All of these problems can be alleviated by the installation of a green roof. Green roofs 
cool the surface of a building" s roof, thereby resulting in lower temperatures in and around the 
building, thus reducing heat island effect. CYNIHIA ROSENZWEIG, STUART GAffiN, & LILY 
PARSHAlL, COLUMBIA UNN. CrR. FORCLIMATESYS. REsFARCH&NASA GODDARD INST. FOR SPACE 
STUDIES, GREEN RooFS IN THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN REGION: REsFARCH REPORT 3 
(Rosenzweig, et al. eds., 2006 ). Green roofs also capture rainfall, thereby reducing storm water 
runoff. !d. at 3-4. 
169. Note LEED Version 3 includes certain revisions that will alleviate some of these 
concerns. See USGBC. LEED 2009 VISION & E XECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 88, at 3-4. For 
example, the new standards incorporate Regional Priority C redits (RPC), which purportedly 
in centivize dev elopers to pursue certain existing credits that focus on "geographically specific 
environmental p olicies," though only four bonus points are available for earning RPCs. USGBC, 
FAQ, Regional Priority Credits Frequently Asked Questions, http: //www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.as 
px?Documenti D=57 32 (last visited Oct. 1, 2009 ). In spite of this change , as will be discussed in 
Part V I.A.2 , a number of municipalities have locked in the LEED Version 2.2 checklist approach, 
and therefore will not be able to take advantage of this new flexibility without overhauling their 
green building ordinances. 
170. See supra Part IV. B ( Scenario 3 or 6). 
171. See supra Part IV. B (Scenario 2 or 5). 
172. LEED Poucy MANUAL, supra note 65, at 20. 
173. LEED POUCY MANUAL, supra note 65 , at 20. 
324 FWRIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol 62 
Adapting LEED involves changing the actual LEED standard to 
improve the way it works for a certain location. 174 Specifically, local 
adaptations can tailor certain LEED prerequisites and credits to regional 
goals, policies, or needs; however, all LEED prerequisites must remain 
intact for projects that plan to apply for LEED certification from the 
USGBC. 17 Although they are permitted, the USGBC severely frowns 
upon adaptations and discourages local governments from implementing 
them. 176 
On the other hand, the USGBC seems to encourage local governments 
to supplement the LEED standards to meet local needs. 177 A supplement is 
a locally created document that sets out requirements that are new or 
different from those required by LEED; the stpJplement is separate and 
apart from the underlying LEED checklist. 17 These supplements are 
preferable to adaptations, according to the USGBC, because LEED and the 
local supplement may be independently modified, thus avoiding the need 
to change the LEED standards themselves. 179 Local governments could 
develop a supplement to LEED that modifies point weightings or creates 
additional credits, so long as those supplemental provisions are scored by 
the local government itself. 180 
174. LEED PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 13. 
175. LEED PRoDUCT DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 13. A gain, 
not all municipal ordinances require that the project actually obtains certification from the USGBC. 
176. LEED PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 15 
("USGBC also strongly discourages the Adaptation of any LEED rating systems for local use."); 
LEED Poucy MANUAL, supra note 65, at 20 ("[A]daptation of LEED Rating systems for local use 
carries significant burdens and responsibilities for the adapting entity. USGBC considers it 
preferable and recommended that any adaptation to local conditions is done by means of a 
supplement to the basic LEED standard which of itself remains intact."); see also Shapiro, supra 
note 134, at 411 ("[T]o the extent that a politically powerful industry supports private standard 
setting , the agency may find it politically difficult to engage in extensive rewriting of private 
standards, although it has the legal capacity to do so."). 
177. According to the USGBC, supplements to LEED "involve changes in point weightings, 
additional credits or modifications outside of [LEED' s existing] flexibility mechanisms." LEED 
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 13-14. Adaptations to 
LEED, on the other hand, "entail making changes to the LEED standard itself to improve the way it 
works for the particular location." LEED PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE MANUAL, 
supra note 73 , at 13. 
178. See, e.g., 0FFICEOFSUSTAINABIEDEV., CITY OF PORTLAND, LEADERSHIP INENERGY AND 
ENVIRONMENTALDESIGN(LEED)GREENBUII1)INGRATINGSYSTIMSUPPLEMENT3(2002),available 
at http://www.portlandonline. com/shared/cfm/image. cfm?id=ll9695 (providing that it was 
developed by the city "to identify both local and state codes that go beyond LEED requirements and 
additional green building strategies that are regionally significant."). 
179. LEED PoLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 20. 
180. LEED POLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 20.The City of Boston has done something like 
this with its private green building ordinance. BOSTON REDEVELOPMENT Aurn., BOSTON ZONING 
CODE& ENABLING ACTart. 37 (2007), available at http: //www. bostonredevelopmentauthority. o 
rg/pdf/ZoningCode/Article37.pdf. The ordinance has four "Boston Green Building Credits" via 
which a project can obtain points that are not included in the LEED checklist, but which Boston 
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Perhaps because supplements place additional burdens on cities, 181 or 
perhaps because most cities are not requiring developers to actually seek 
certification from the USGBC, 182 many cities that have imported or 
referenced LEED in their private green building ordinances have neither 
supplemented nor adapted it. 
In sum, LEED is currently a de facto national program, even though 
local governments are requiring, and sometimes enforcing, it. Because 
LEED is promulgated by a single entity and makes available the exact 
same number of LEED points to a project that is located in Tempe, 
Arizona, as it does to one located in Portland, Oregon, it contains many of 
the problems that other national-level programs entail. 183 To meet the 
regime goal of efficacy, which requires addressing locality-specific 
problems of public health, welfare, and environmental pollution, green 
building programs should be designed at a local level. 184 
B. 	Lost in Translation: Voluntary Leadership Standards Do Not 
Translate Well Into Law 
The USGBC designed LEED to be a voluntary leadership standard. 185 
By their nature, "[v ]oluntary programs are non-mandatory codes of 
conduct that actors, Earticularly businesses, pledge to apply to their 
internal operations. "1 6 The creation of voluntary standards for industry 
self-regulation inherently involves very different elements than does the 
creation of a law or statute to be imposed upon that industry by the 
government. Further, attempting to require implementation of voluntary 
believes are important in order to address its specific local environmental concerns. See id. § 3 7-4. 
181. LEED PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE MANUAL, supra note 7 3, at 13. 
182. Rebecca C. Retzlaff, The Use ofLEED in Planning and Development Regulation: An 
Exploratory Analysis, 29 J. PLAN. Enuc . & REs. 67, 70 (2009) (noting that only twelve jurisdictions 
instituted requirements for certain developers to utilize the LEED assessment system). 
183. See supra Part II. B. 1 (discussing how national pro grams may not address local problems); 
see also Jonathan H. Adler, Reforming Our Wasteful Hazardous Waste Policy , 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. 
L.J. 7 24, 727 (2008) (arguing that national-level policies regarding hazardous waste "impose 
extensive federal requirements . . with little regard for local risk preferences, environmental 
priorities, or ecological conditions"). 
184. This approach will also allow for experimentation with different, alternative methods of 
regulation. Such experimentation would allow us to determine which methods work well, and which 
do not work at all, even tually leading to a better system. If all local governments adopt and 
implement LEED-the current trend-we will be deprived of having alternative approaches for 
comparison. See Peter H. Aranson, Pollution Control: The Case for Competition, in INSTEAD OF 
REGULATION: ALTERNATIVES TO FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 339, 384 (Robert W. Poole , Jr. 
ed. , 1982). 
185. See Michael D. Berrisford, In Conversation with Kevin Hydes, in WHo' s GREEN 25, 27 
(Ecotone Publishing LLC 2007). 
186. Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash, Do Voluntary Pro grams Matter? An Empirical 
Examination of ISO 14001 Adoption and Firms' Environmental Performan ce 1 (Apr. 15 , 2004) 
(unpublished manuscript, http: //www.allacademic. com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/8/3 / 
717/p8377 8_index.html) (emphasis added). 
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standards is counter-productive because it takes away the element of 
choice. The goal ofefficacy would be better achieved through the creation 
of mandates that were intended as mandates from their inception. 
Even where governments do not adopt voluntary standards into law, 
commentators have noted, "[v ]oluntary environmental regulations make 
for challenging analysis, since the regulation and its impact really 
represents the outcome of three interdependent theaters of strategic 
action. "187 Those three theaters are: (1) potential regulatees have the choice 
as to whether they want to join in the agreement; (2) the terms of the 
voluntary standards are negotiated by members to the agreement; and (3) 
those adhering to the standards determine how to proceed. 188 As it was 
intended to operate, all three actions ring true for LEED. However, once 
governments decide to require compliance with those standards, (1) 
regulatees no longer have a choice as to whether they want to join (unless 
that choice is scaled back to the choice of whether or not to build a 
structure in the municipality); and (2) the LEED standards have already 
been set, and in most instances locked into the municipal law, without 
necessary participation by the new regulatee (of course, it is possible that 
the builder at issue could have been a USGBC member or contributed 
comments to the LEED standard adoption process, but this is by no means 
certain). As for theater (3), in some instances, private builders who are 
required by municipal law to comply with LEED standards still have some 
leeway in determining how to proceed. For example, though a local 
ordinance might require compliance with LEED standards at the LEED 
Certified level, a developer might choose to actually pursue certification 
from the USGBC and perhaps at the more stringent Silver or Gold level, 
instead of the Certified level. 
One interesting issue that surfaces when private, voluntary LEED 
standards are non-discerningly translated into mandatory requirements 
concerns the timing of certification. When a developer voluntarily seeks 
LEED certification pursuant to LEED' s intended operation as a market­
based system, the J§roject is not awarded LEED certification until it has 
been constructed. 1 One reason for this is that until a building is actually 
constructed it is impossible to determine whether certain points have been 
achieved, as a building's initial plans and its final layout are not always 
187. NAT'LCrn.. FORENVTL REs., U.S. ENVTL PRoT.AGFNCY, VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL 
STANDARDS: FURTIIERING MoRAL SUASION WHIIB PREVENTING MORAL HAZARD ( 2001), 
http: I I cfpub. epa. gov /ncer_abstracts/index. cfm/fuseaction/ display. abstractDetail/abstract/ 
211/report/0. 
188. /d. 
189. GRFEN BWG. CERTIFICATION lNST., POUCY MANUAL, http://www. gbci.org/DisplayPage. as 
px?CMSPageiD=l56#Application_Review_Policies (noting that applicants must submit an 
application for construction review within two years of "substantial project completion"'). While 
there are reviews along the way to determine whether credits or points are likely to be achieved, 
final determination is made upon completion. !d. 
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identical. Further, a few credits require a performance analysis of the 
building before the USGBC will conclusively determine that the building 
has earned those credits. 190 
Thus, official LEED certification from the USGBC might not issue for 
months or fears after building construction has begun or even 
completed. 19 In the context of LEED as a market tool, this is not 
worrisome. A developer only needs to be able to conclusively represent 
that her project is LEED Certified when she is ready to "sell" it to a 
purchaser or user (be that a tenant, a building manager, or an owner). 
Again, by obtaining LEED certification, a developer can represent to others 
in the community that her building will provide a healthy, environmentally 
friendly, "green" place to live or work. This not only raises her standing in 
the eyes of environmentally conscious potential purchasers but also those 
of the environmentally conscious community members generally. 
However, when a city borrows and mandates LEED standards, a timing 
issue arises, especially if the cit~ requires private developers to obtain 
certification from the USGBC. 92 Many ordinances require proof of 
compliance with LEED standards prior to the issuance of a building 
permit, which is of course required prior to the start of construction. Thus, 
compliance with LEED has been transformed from an after-the-fact 
marketing tool to a before-the-fact hurdle. 
There are additional inherent problems in making a leadership standard 
into code. For example, LEED as a voluntary standard will typically make 
sense for those who choose to adopt it and implement it in the construction 
ofa building. However, due to the one-size-fits-all nature ofLEED, it will 
not be profitable or feasible for every commercial building over a certain 
size to adhere to its standards. For example, LEED awards points based on 
a project's location, including points for proximity to transit hubs. This 
makes sense for an office building or residential high-rise, but not for an 
industrial building that will produce noise and dust-such a building 
would be more appropriately located away from a bustling city center. 
On this same note, requiring projects to achieve a certain level of 
190. See, e.g., LIV HASELBACH, THE ENGINEERING GUIDE TO LEED-NEWC oNSTRUCTION 123 
(2008) (discussing "Energy and Atmosphere Prerequisite 1: Fundamental Commissioning of the 
Building Energy Systems"). 
191. Of note, there is currently a large backlog at the USGBC, with more than 10,000 
individual projects registered for certification according to its latest count as of June 4, 2008, and 
more signing up daily. Andrew Burr, In an Anticipated Debut, Future ofLEED Arrives on 2009 
Platform, USGBC IN THE NEWS (CoStar Group, Bethesda, Md.), June 4, 2008, 
http: //www. usgbc. org/News/USGBCinTheNewsDetails.aspx?ID=3720. As a testament to the 
increased traffic , the USGBC certified the same number of LEED projects in the 2006-2007 span as 
it did in its entire six prior years of existence. /d. 
192. Most municipalities (at this point) do not require actual certification from the USGBC 
prior to the issuance of a building permit or certificate of occupancy. 
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certification breeds corruption. 193 If a city requires, for example, Silver or 
equivalent certification, developers will seek out the cheapest and easiest 
points possible, even if those points will not actually result in a more 
environmentally friendly building. 194 The benefit ofthe voluntary nature of 
LEED is that developers can decide for themselves how green they want to 
go. 195 This element of choice is lost when the voluntary, market-based 
standard is converted into a mandate. This is a problem with the current 
trend, which fails to result in an efficacious green building regime. 
C. Industry Capture: Self-Regulation and Inherent Bias in a 

Privately Promulgated Standards System 

Because the USGBC's founders were members of the industry they 
sought to regulate, they certainly were not going to impose upon 
themselves standards so strict that they could not comfortably be met 
(either technologically, or from a financial perspective). Private 
organizations have an incentive to-and in fact do-set their own 
standards too low to internalize costs. 196 This results in a set of standards 
that does not actually re9ulate to a point where it has an effect on the 
conduct of the industry. 19 Thus, the standards created by the USGBC are 
193. Randy Udall & Auden Schendler, LEED Is Broken; Let's Fix It, GRIST, Oct. 26, 2005, 
available at http: //www.igreenbuild.com/cd~l706.aspx. Udall and and Schendler provide an 
example of a point mongering situation: 
On one project we considered installing a reflective roof. LEED encourages this 
because black roofs contribute to the "heat island" effect that raises urban air­
conditioning bills. Reflective roofs and parking surfaces address this problem, 
saving energy. But at 8,000 feet in the Rockies, heat islands are not an issue. Still, 
if we can get the credit, we'd have a better shot at a higher LEED rating, so why 
not try? Disingenuous? Absolutely. Fair? Not to anyone, and here" s why. If we 
point out that we don't really need the high albedo roof, we'd lose our shot at the 
credit, shrinking the pool of possible points we can get. If we go for the credit 
knowing it" s irrelevant, we're corrupt. Do you play the game, or not? 
!d. 
194. This is due to the USGBC' s failure to weight LEED points according to their 
environmental benefits. 
195. Of course, there is the risk that, as Udall and Schendler mention, any developer who is 
seeking LEED certification will want the highest level possible, and thus will be tempted to try to 
get all possible points whether relevant or not. This is not inherently tied to the fact that the 
standard is required, as opposed to voluntary. 
196. Like the LEED standards, the International Organization for Standardization's (ISO) 
14000 environmental management standards directly affect a large " set of stakeholders 
[who] ... carry the burden of environmental 'externalities' , ... while [the] industry stands to 
enhance profits by 'externalizing' environmental impacts." Morrison & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 
126, at 522. 
197. See Morrison & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 126, at 523 ("There is ... an inherent tendency 
for private standards to be, overall, less stringent than public ones covering the same subject 
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for the most part easy to meet, but not strict enough to solve any real 
environmental problems. 198 The benefit of easy-to-meet standards is that 
developers are more willing to comply with them. While this makes sense 
for a voluntary system (which LEED was designed to be), it is not 
sufficient for a government mandate that aims to aggressively alleviate 
local environmental externalities and combat greenhouse gas emissions 
and other negative contributors to climate change. 
The USGBC, although itself a non-profit entity, is "subject to the 
control of economic actors" (its building industry membership), and thus 
"will resolve policy issues in a manner that maximizes ... the profit of 
"
199those who control it. Indeed, commentators have noted that even in 
non-profit groups, the decision-making process tends to be controlled 
primarily by industry insiders and representatives. 200 
While early critics alleged that LEED certification cost too much, more 
recent data show that basic certification actually adds only a modest 
percentage to upfront costs, most of which are recovered in operational 
costs within one to two years. 201 Further, if one considers the tax incentives 
and rebates offered by some localities, combined with the possibility that 
the developer might also be the building's long-term operator, even more 
cost-savings are possible from the construction ofa green building. 202 The 
matter."'). 
198. In some instances-especially if a project is to be constructed on an infill site near public 
transit-in order to achieve the basic LEED Certified level of certification, a developer will not 
need to do much beyond what he or she would typically do for a Class A office building. 
Obviously, if Gold or Platinum level certification is sought or required, a developer will have to 
incorporate more environmentally-sensitive techniques than he or she might otherwise have done. 
199. Shapiro, supra note 134, at 404. 
200. Shapiro, supra note 134, at 407 ('"Because [of] the ... industry orientation of most 
technical committees, the costs and complexity of increased safety orpurity will almost certainly be 
weighted more heavily by these committees than by an individual whose primary concern is safety 
or health...."'(alteration and omissions in original) (quoting Robert W. Hamilton, The Role of 
Nongovernmental Standards in the Development ofMandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety 
or Health, 56 TEX. L. REv. 1329, 1378 (1978)). Here, in addition to the health and safety of 
individuals living in and near the buildings, cities are concerned with the health and safety of the 
environment. 
201. Some critics allege that LEED is an elite standard meant for expensive signature 
buildings, and that too few buildings adopt the standard because it is too hard and expensive for 
them to attain. See, e.g., GREG KATS, THE COSTS AND FINANCIAL BENEFITS OFGREEN BUILDINGS: A 
REPORT TO CALIFORNIA'S SUSTAINABLE BUilDING TASK FORCE 12-18 (2003), http ://www.cap­
e.com/ ewebeditpro/items/059F3259.pdf. However, others say basic LEED Certification can be 
obtained for as little as 2 to 3% of the total construction costs. !d. (surveying costs in two 
municipalities with extensive LEED activities and concluding that the average cost premium for 
obtaining LEED certification averaged less than 2% of the total construction costs). Operational 
cost recovery is not recognized by many developers and builders who merely construct the building 
and then sell it. However, those future operational savings can be built into the sale price of the 
structure. 
202. Interestingly, some green building materials are cheaper than their non-green 
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relative affordability of certification is both a positive and a negative. 
On the positive side, and from an economic perspective, developers 
constructing large projects should willingly include green features that will 
only add 1 to 2% percent to their total construction costs. Because the price 
is low, more people would be inclined to add these features to their 
projects-this is the beauty of a voluntary certification system with 
standards that are within reach. Similarly, developers are more likely to 
comply with something that their compatriots constructed than with 
something imposed upon them by those outside of or opposed to their 
. d :t03m ustry. 
On the other hand, especially ifa municipality requires green features, it 
would seem that most large projects could afford to spend a bit more if that 
additional capital would enable the building to alleviate even more local 
environmental concerns. For example, under LEED Version 2.2, up to ten 
points are available for optimizing energy performance. 204 Similarll, up to 
three points are available for providing on-site renewable energy. 20 While 
these measures would go a long way toward reducing a building's 
contribution to global warming, all thirteen points are rarely garnered due 
to cost and to the fact that other, less-costly points are available in other 
categories. 
The USGBC standard developers recognized that obtaining these points 
would result in an environmentally beneficial building, and thus included 
them as possibilities.206 However, they also wanted to give themselves the 
option ofachieving an equal number of less costly points. This is a benefit 
of self-regulation. 
If non-building-industry-insiders, such as environmental advocates or 
clean energy proponents, had created the original version of LEED, it is 
possible that the cost of LEED certification would be more, but it would 
also be more efficacious, resulting in greater environmental benefit. 207 For 
counterparts. For example. fly ash. a byproduct of coal-fired power plants, can be mixed with 
concrete to increase its strength and durability. Further, fly ash is less costly than cement, which is 
typically used m concrete. Toolbase Services, Ay Ash Concrete, 
http: //www. tool base. org/T echnology-Inventory/Foundations/fly-ash-concrete (last visited Jan. 24, 
2010). 
203. A "decision's acceptability is enhanced if those directly affected participate in its 
making." Lawrence, supra note 136, at 653. 
204. LEED FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION V 2. 2, REGISTERED PROJECT C!IECKUST, supra note 89, at 
2. 
205. LEED FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION V 2. 2, REGISTERED PROJECT CHECKUST, supra note 89, at 
2. 
206. Of course, some in the green building industry are acting, at least in part, out of a moral 
commitment to efficient buildings and sustainable development principles. See supra notes 63 and 
accompanying text (discussing the membership composition of USGBC). 
207. In contrast, take the example of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) , which was 
founded by the environmental non-governmental organization the World Wildlife Fund. See Errol 
Meidinger, The Administrative Law ofGlobal Private -Public Regulation: the Case ofForestry, 17 
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example, if a local green building ordinance were to style these important 
Energy and Atmosphere Credits as prerequisites to obtaining a LEED 
certifiable determination, developers would internalize the costs and build 
their projects anyway. 208 Of course, a city does not want to impose 
standards so stringent as to be impossible to comply with because that 
would incentivize a developer to build somewhere else entirely. 209 But 
more than a bare minimum should be required. 210 
EUR. J. Im'LL. 47, 51 (2006). The FSC' s program for forest certification imposes standards that go 
beyond mere consideration of what would be best for a "profit-maximizing corporation[]," and 
includes requirements based upon considerations of human rights and sustainable development, 
including requiring "protection of indigenous peoples, workers, communities and the environment" 
/d. at 61-62. One can compare these standards to the original Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) 
forest certification standards, which had no requirements pertaining to indigenous peoples, workers, 
or communities. /d. at 62. The SFI standards were developed by the American Forest and Paper 
Association, which was made up of 200 of the largest companies in the forestry industry. /d. at 54; 
see also Russell Mokhiber & Robert Weissman, Timber Ad Cut, COMMON DREAMS.ORG, Apr. 3, 
2001, http ://www.commondreams.org/viewsO 110403-07.htrn ("Forest Ethics, a Berkeley, 
California-based advocacy group that works to protect the ancient rainforests of British Columbia 
and endangered forests of North America by redirecting U.S . markets toward ecologically sound 
alternatives . say[s] SFI is a sham, and [is] urging wood buyers to give preference to wood 
certified by the Forest Stewardship Council, an independent organization."). 
208. We see this in other mandatory land use regulatory contexts. Although there is initial 
outcry from developers that they will not be able to afford to comply with the requirements, they 
find a way to do so. For example, San Francisco has an Inclusionary Affordable Housing 
Ordinance. See S.F. CAL. PLANNING CODE§ 315 (2009). Pursuant to this ordinance, a developer of 
certain new market rate housing must make 15% of the total units affordable to families of low­
incomes if those affordable units are constructed on-site, as part of the project. !d. § 315.4. If the 
developer does not want to include on-site affordable units, he can create an off-site affordable­
housing project with 20%ofthe total market rate units, or pay an in-lieu fee. /d.§ 315.5. This is an 
extremely costly requirement, but developers in San Francisco have learned to factor it into their 
pro formas when evaluating a potential project. The same would be true of costly green building 
requirements. 
209. See supra Part II. B.3 (discussing race-to-the-bottom theory). 
210. A similar problem occurs in the automobile industry. Automobile manufacturers are 
capable of making cars with higher fuel efficien cy standards than they currently do-though it 
would, of course, cost the automobile manufacturers more money to impose higher standards. See 
James Surowiecki, Fuelfor Thought, THE NEW YoRKER, July 23, 2007, at 25 (describing hesitancy 
of auto industry to manufacture more fuel-efficient cars, citing "'massive financial and 
unemployment problems.'"). Such cars are on the road in other countries. See Roland Jones, U.S. 
"Stuck in Reverse" on Fuel Efficiency, MSNBC.coM, Feb. 28, 2007, http: //www.msnbc.msn.com/ 
id/ 17 344368/ (noting that in 2007, there were only two cars with a fuel efficiency offorty miles per 
gallon for sale in the United States, compared to 113 such cars for sale in Europe). However, the 
automobile industry has so captured their regulators that the regulators have been hesitant to impose 
stricter standards, even though they are possible and could aid in the fight against climate change. 
See John M. Broder, Obama Directs Regulators to Tighten Auto Rules, N.Y. TlMES, Jan. 26,2009, 
available at 2009 WLNR 1539640 ("The auto companies have lobbied hard against [recent 
regulations requiring 40% improvement in gas mileage by 2020] and have challenged them in 
court.") In fact, it is only quite recently that President Obama took a step toward reversing this 
trend, directing federal regulators to act on an application by several states to set their own 
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In some instances, regulatory capture is not an entirely bad thing. For 
example, consider building safety and fire standards, which are 
promulgated by private organizations. With respect to these standards, an 
overly cautious industry has captured the regulatory drafting body: 
insurance companies. Because insurance companies do not want to pay out 
on claims due to fires caused by faulty wiring or the lack of sufficient 
separation between walls, they want to ensure that buildings are going to 
be constructed in conformity with highly protective, fire-resistant 
standards.211 This is not, however, the case with the building industry. 
While developers want their buildings to be well-constructed to avoid any 
claims that might befall them were the building to collapse or otherwise be 
unsafe, they also are likely more interested in the bottom line on their pro 
formas than the health of local rivers and streams. Thus, where we have 
capture by an industry that is not extremely cautious, and direct health and 
safety issues (as opposed to indirect ones) are not on the line, it is safe to 
say that capture is a negative. 
This capture has led to other less-than-ideal LEED structural elements. 
For example, just as LEED points are not weighted based on regional 
differences,212 they are not weighted according to their environmental 
importance. A system that provides points that cost less but result in the 
same environmental benefit as more costly points would be welcomed. 213 
However, LEED is not such a system. An extreme example of this is that, 
under LEED Version 2.2, one point is available for providing bike racks , 
while one point is available for installing an expensive HV AC system.214 
Similarly, one point is available for using low-emitting paints and coatings 
on the interior ofthe building, while one point is available for projects that 
treat 50% of their wastewater on-site to tertiary standards (and the treated 
emissions limits for automobiles. /d. Although President Obama" s directive does not mandate that 
the Environmental Protection Agency must allow the applications, such a result is expected, 
possibly bringing much-needed change to this area. /d. 
211. There is an argument that capture is not relevant here, as the insurance industry can 
regulate privately by setting their premiums, thereby controlling behavior directly. 
212. See supra Part V.A.l. 
213. If the environmental output were the same, a well-crafted system would encourage 
developers to choose the least costly points available; this would be a positive economic decision 
for them, and would effectively reduce environmental externalities. A point system has the ability to 
internalize not just the cost to the builder (like a tax system), but the entire cost-benefit analysis that 
the builder must conduct. 
214. LEEDFORNEWCONSIRUCTIONV 2.2, REGISTERED PROJECTCHECKUST, supra note 89, at 
1-2 (noting, specifically, Sustainable Sites Credit4.2 and Energy and Atmosphere Credit4). LEED 
Version 3 aims to address this complaint through a new credit-weighting paradigm, which 
reco gnizes that more points should be available for credits that relate to "more important building 
impacts." USGBC, LEED 2009 CREDIT WEIGHTING 1 (2008), available at http: //www.usgbc­
ncc. org/storage/usgbcncc l/documents/leed_2009 _-_ weightings_overview. pdf. While this 
recognition is important, it is presently just a prototype and is expressly not "a wholesale 
reinvention of weightings." Jd . 
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water must then be infiltrated or used on site)?15 Such a distribution is 
facially inequitable, and such an approach leads to a building that is not 
holistic. 216 This misallocation of points may be directly attributable to the 
fact that the USGBC wanted to create a voluntary system that, if fully 
complied with (e.g., LEED Platinum certification), would result in a truly 
green building. However, they also wanted to allow developers to do a bare 
minimum, by choosing the "easy points, " while still maintaining the 
appearance of being green (and being able to market themselves as 
such).217 
If, instead of adopting the existing LEED standards as they are, local 
governments were to analyze which of the points were most important due 
to local environmental conditions and were to modify the standards 
themselves, they could combat some of these inherent problems. 
Specifically, local governments could pass ordinances fitting Scenario 2 or 
3, or even Scenario 5 or 6, using the supplementation or adaptation 
processes provided b;:: LEED to make some of the more costly items 
required prerequisites.218 Similarly, they could use the same basic LEED 
requirements, but adjust the point weightings based on their local 
environmental concerns. This would especially make sense in certain 
localities that have specific needs (such as requiring water conservation 
elements in drought-prone areas or requiring white roofs in large cities).219 
D. Prescriptive Versus Performance-Based Standards: Private 

Interests Means that LEED Does Not Go Far Enough 

LEED is a predominantly prescriptive system, meaning that it sets forth 
the types of materials and methods to be used, but does not require 
performance to certain levels, and tends to discourage innovation. In 
contrast, a performance-based system sets certain goals to be achieved, 
often leaving the methods of reaching those goals to the entity being 
215. LEEDFORNEWCONSIRUCTIONV 2.2. REGIS'IERED PROJECTCHECKI.lST, supra note 89, at 
1, 3 (noting, specifically, Indoor Environmental Quality Credit 4. 2 and Water Efficiency Credit 2 ). 
21 6. Further, the current point system encourages builders to choose the cheapest combination 
of points that they can, instead of choosing points that will truly result in an environmentally 
beneficial building. 
217 . Roht-Arriaza & Morrison. supra note 126, at 523 ("The very flexibility that businesses 
appreciate reduces the credibility of these standards with local community, NGO, and regulatory 
audiences. If enterprises can pick and choose which environmental issues to focus on ... there will 
be little assurance that major problems are not being swept under the rug. And if the private 
standards are rigorous enough in design and verification mechanisms to avoid this problem, they 
will also, by definition , be to o rigorous to entice any but a few leading companies into choosing to 
implement them ...."). 
218. See supra Part V.A.2 (discussing adaptation and supplementation). 
219. See Arthur H. Rosenfeld, Joseph J. Romm, Hashem Akbari , & Alan C. Lloyd, Painting 
the Town White-and Green: The Winter Penalty, MIT TECH. R , Feb. 1997 , at 52, available at 
http: //www. technologyreview. com/ energy/1 8453/?a=f (noting white , or "cool" roofs, have been 
proven to decrease "heat island effect," which is mo st prominent in large cities). 
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regulated; the key is the end result. Performance-based systems tend to 
encourage innovation, and in the green building context would also allow 
greater determination of how "green" these buildings really are. 220 Such 
information could then be used to modify future versions of the green 
building ordinances. 
Because they require testing to verify whether they have been achieved, 
goal or performance-based standards are often more difficult and costly to 
meet and enforce, as well as riskier, than prescriptive standards. 221 At the 
same time, they are also more likely to result in actual environmental 
benefits than are prescriptive standards. But due to the cost and risk 
involved in performance-based standards, industry-derived standards are 
l"k 1 b . . 222more 1 e y to e prescnpt1ve. 
The prevalence ofprescriptive standards and lack ofperformance-based 
standards result in a set of green building requirements that encourage 
people to comply with the status quo. Thus, builders call themselves 
"green," when in actuality they are doing little beyond what they might 
have otherwise done anyway. For example, an infill developer whose 
projects always involve brownfield or greyfield redevelopment within city 
limits, close to public transportation and other amenities, will easily 
achieve Sustainable Sites credits. In fact, it is likely that developer would 
include as project features items re~uired under those credits even if she 
was not seeking LEED certification. 23 
One benefit of having an ordinance is that those who are subject to it 
are required to comply with it. Unlike a voluntary standard or an incentive­
based system, cities that adopt mandatory green building ordinances have 
decided that people must adjust their construction habits to improve the 
planet. Therefore, cities should be willing to impose tough regulations, not 
just requirements that give an appearance of being environmentally 
220. A performance-based standard could be used to require reduced parking and traffic 
generation relative to a baseline. For example, a 20% reduction in vehicle trips relative to the 
baseline could result in one point, while a 60% reduction could result in three points. See Todd 
Litman, Victoria Transp. Policy lnst., RECOMMENDATIONSFOR IMPROVING LEEDTRANSPORTATION 
AND PARKING CREDrrs 11 (2008), available at http: //www.vtpi. org/leed_rec.pdf. 
221. It is impossible to determine if a performance-based standard has been met until the 
project has been completed, and the item can be measured. Thus, there is a risk in that a developer 
will not know if he has met the requirements of such a standard until everything is in place and 
completed. This may cause a developer to devalue its building, due to the inability to accurately 
assess risks. 
222. Standards created by those outside the regulatory industry, though, often contain 
performance-based standards. For example, Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) forest certification, a 
nan-forest-industry-based program created by predominantly environmental interests, incorporates a 
number of performance standards, which "require the achievement of concrete conditions in the 
forest or in human organizations related to the forest." Meidinger, supra note 207 , at 65. 
223. For example, the developer will build close to public transit and neighborhood amenities 
and provide on-site open space. Although this developer, with a history of engaging in 
environmentally preferable practices, should not be penalized or held to a higher standard than a 
suburban-style developer, if a city finds that most of its development is already infill, it should insist 
upon a green building ordinance that goes beyond LEED. 
335 2010] M UNICIPAL ADOPTIONOF PRIVATE GREENBUILDING STA N DARDS 
forward. 224 Government-created (e.g., Scenario 1), or at least government­
vetted and modified (e.g., Scenarios 2 or 5), green building standards could 
go further in requiring a real change in "business as usual" in the building 
and construction arena. 
VI. LEGITIMATE PROCESS AND THE METHODS BY WHICH LEED 

STANDARDS ARE PROMULGATED AND ADOPTED INTO MUNICIPAL LAW 

The preceding Part focused on the content of green building 
regulations, and argued that the regime goal of efficacy will not be met 
through a system that is created on a national level by a private, industry­
based organization. This Part addresses the second regime goal- a 
legitimate process-in an attempt to demonstrate that this goal will not be 
achieved by public adoption ofprivate LEED standards. When a legitimate 
process is lacking, as it is here, we must see ifthe existing process provides 
adequate "substitutes" for legitimacy-those elements that make a process 
legitimate in the first place- such as democracy, transparency, notice, and 
an incentive and opportunity for voice and exit. The USGBC's current 
promulgation process does not sufficiently address these concerns; thus, 
legitimate process can only be achieved through a green building ordinance 
that is promulgated locally and publicly. 
A. 	Lost In Translation: The USGBC 's Process Was Not Designed 
To Ensure Publicly Legitimate Democracy 
There are two levels of process at issue with respect to municipal 
adoption of LEED-based green building ordinances. The first is the local 
government process by which a municipality adopts an ordinance that uses 
the LEED standards as its content. Because this is a governmental process, 
it is presumptively legitimate.Z25 However, it is the content ofthe ordinance 
that is key. In many cities' green building ordinances, the content is 
determined not through that local process, but through the underlying 
USGBC LEED standards-creation and adoption process. 226 
Although the USGBC' s administrative processes are adequate with 
respect to the purposes for which they were created (LEED as a voluntary, 
consensus-based, market-force standard), they do not ensure that the 
regime goal oflegitimate process will be met when translated to mandatory 
municipal green building ordinances. The processes put in place by the 
USGBC to create the LEED standards sufficiently allow potentially 
interested players (e.g., those who think they might want to obtain LEED 
224. If a city makes a determination that it wants to address its local environmental 
externalities, and wants to alleviate larger environmental concerns like climate change, it should be 
willing to "put its money where its mouth is." A city that makes this determination, but is not 
willing to invest any time or resources in to developing a system that will actually work, is just 
furthering the "greenwashing" problem that has plagued so many since "green" became a 
commodity. 
225. Meidinger, supra note 207, at 81. 
226. The details of that process were set forth in Part III. B. 
336 FWRIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol 62 
certification) to gain knowledge of, and take part in, the standards-creation 
process. They participate in electing the individuals who will design the 
standards, they can voice their opinions about the content of the proposed 
standards through the comment process, and perhaps most importantly, if 
they do not agree with the final content of the standards, they have the 
complete ability to exit by deciding not to seek LEED certification. 
A key element of a voluntary system such as LEED is that those who 
would be subject to it can decide whether they want to be subject to it. 
Transforming voluntary participation into mandatory compliance forces 
those who would have opted out not to do so and forces those who were 
not involved with the development of the standards to comply with them. 
Requiring private developers to comply with voluntary LEED standards is 
therefore problematic. Whether those developers did or did not participate 
in the LEED standards creation process, they now lack a major element 
that made the USGBC' s administrative promulgation process legitimate: 
b"l" . 227 the a 1 tty to exit. 
1. Legitimacy of Private Standards-Making Bodies 
If we ignore, for a moment, the fact that the standards promulgated by 
the USGBC's processes are being adopted into governmental codes, we 
can examine the literature that addresses general rule-making processes for 
social and environmental standard-setting organizations-in other words, 
the USGBC's administrative processes as they were intended to be used. 
While the USGBC aims for a legitimate process, and provides one in the 
context of creating a voluntary standard, it does not provide enough 
assurance that these standards can be legitimately imported into local codes 
and required of private developers. 
The International Social and Environmental Accreditation and 
Labelling Alliance (ISEAL) is a collaboration of leading international 
standard-setting and conformity-assessment organizations focused on 
social and environmental issues. 228 In 2006 this group issued a "Code of 
Good Practice," which, if followed, would purportedly aid in the 
legitimacy of certification-related standards promulgated by non­
. . . 2291 dar -settmg orgamzatwns. governmenta , stan d 
227 . They can. of course. exit by deciding not to build in the locality, but that is an exit of a 
much greater scale. 
228. ISEAL Alliance, About the ISEAL Alliance, http://www.isealalliance.org/index.cfm? 
fuseaction=Page. viewPage&pageld=4 7 1. 
229. ISEAL, ISEAL CODE OF GooD PRACTICE FOR SETIING SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
STANDARDS 2. (2006), available at http: //www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_uploadlcontent/POOS_ 
ISEAL_Code_PD4_Jan_06.pdf; see also Meidinger, supra note 207 , at 68-69. The American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI) is another organization that approves standards, as well as the 
processes used to create them. ANSI, About ANSI Overview, http ://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/over 
view/overview.aspx?menuid=l (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). Currently none of the USGBC' s LEED 
standards are ANSI approved; however, the USGBC itself is an ANSI standards developing 
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ISEAL suggests that organizations take certain steps to ensure the 
promulgation of standards in a legitimate and transparent way, including: 
(1) following documented procedures, including a complaints resolution 
mechanism; (2) giving interested parties an opportunity to comment about 
whether the standards are needed when a new standard is being developed; 
(3) allowing two rounds of comment submissions by interested parties 
during public review with a minimum sixty-day comment period; ( 4) 
compiling comments and preparing responses to those comments, 
indicating how the issues have been addressed in the standards; (5) striving 
for a consensus among a balance of interested parties; (6) promptly 
publishing approved standards; and (7) maintaining records of standards 
. . . 230deve1opment activities. 
ISEAL recommends providing commenting power to all "interested 
parties," which it defines as "[aJni' person or group concerned with or 
directly affected by a standard." 3 This implies that those who are not 
members of the organization but who might be affected by a standard 
should be permitted to comment.232 In the LEED context, this would 
clearly include developers who might eventually be required, via a local 
ordinance, to comply with the LEED standards, as well as local residents 
who are impacted by environmental externalities of buildings. USGBC's 
notice and comment process may appear to be generally consistent with 
ISEAL' s recommendations. Although notice of revisions to standards is 
only directly given to USGBC members, both members and nonmembers 
may comment on proposed standards. Notwithstanding, only members can 
vote to approve the standards, and there is no true incentive for most 
individuals who are not in the development industry to participate in the 
promulgation ofLEED standards, not knowing that compliance with those 
standards may eventually be required of developers in their towns. 
ISEAL also suggests that "participation reflects a balance of interests 
among interested parties in the subject matter and in the geographic scope 
to which the standard applies" and that "[s]tandard-setting organizations 
shall include a balance of interests in the structures that are responsible for 
developing and approving social and environmental standards. "233 While 
we have information about how membership on USGBC's standards­
creation committees is determined, we have no assurance that all sectors of 
membership will be equally represented on those committees, nor that they 
will not be dominated by building industry interests. 234 
organization. Interview with Deon Glaser, supra note 82. 
230. ISEAL. supra note 229. at 4--5; see also Meidinger, supra note 207, at 68. 
231. I SEAL, supra note 229, at 3. 
232. See Meidinger, supra note 207 , at 7 0 ("The underlying idea is that a standard will be 
good, and presumably legitimate, if it reflects the priorities of interested parties."). 
233. ISEAL, supra note 229, at 6. 
234. See supra notes 64--66 and accompanying text. 
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Further, although these committees can, and possibly do, have varied 
representation from within the USGBC' s membership ranks, they are made 
up of private individuals. 235 Though membership is in theory open to all, 
not just "anyone" can in fact be an active organization member. First, 
members must be able to pay a fee to join the organization. Further-and 
this is especially true of committee members who are very involved with 
the process of developing new standards-they must be able to afford to 
donate their time to attend meetings. Moreover, while some committee 
members are elected by a portion of the USGBC membership, some are 
appointed, either by existing committee members or by USGBC' supper 
level executive Board and Steering Committees. Despite these concerns, 
the USGBC' s internal methods appear to be generally consistent with the 
ISEAL principles, and thus likely impart legitimacy to their voluntary 
consensus standards-development process. In spite of the process used to 
create standards, even the USGBC recognizes that if it can get the 
standards themselves accredited by a third-party accreditation program 
such as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), it will go a long 
way towards making it easier for governments to adopt those standards and 
feel more comfortable with the level oflegitimacy and public participation 
that goes into the adoption process. However, even if they are legitimate 
for the purposes for which they were created, the USGBC' s administrative 
process does not conclusively impart sufficient legitimacy to the LEED 
promulgation process for those standards to be imported into public law. 236 
B. Ensuring Legitimate Process Through Substitutes for Legitimacy 
1. Legitimacy 
At its base, a regulatory system is legitimate if it can "be traced to a 
properly functioning organ of a state; states themselves [are] presumptively 
235. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, I would also point out that private actors, 
such as the USGBC committee members, are not state actors, and thus need not obey the same types 
of norms. See Shapiro, supra note 134, at 419 ("[P]rivate actors are not constrained in the same 
manner as government actors to obey such important norms as fairness, nonarbitrariness, and 
nondiscrimination."); see also Martha Minow, Publicand Private Partnerships: Accounting for the 
New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1229, 1246 (2003 ) (noting that ceding control to private entities 
"creates possibilities of weakening or avoiding public norms that attach, in the legal sense, to 'state 
action' or conduct by government"). 
236. The USGBC system is not inherently democratic, in that each member organization gets a 
single vote. See Bodansky, supra note 137, at 7 15. This means that an organization with 500 
members has the same control and weight as an organization with five members. See id. ("There is 
nothing obviously democratic about a system that gives 10,000 inhabitants of a small-island state 
the same weight as one billion inhabitants of China or India."). Similarly, public participation, 
while encouraging transparent processes, does not necessarily result in a legitimate process, 
especially when the participating "public" is in fact merely groups, each of which is given one vote, 
purporting to represent their members. Finally, while expert opinions are often entitled to deference, 
their decisions are not intrinsically correct, nor will they necessarily produce the best outcomes. 
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legitimate. "237 When legitimacy cannot be traced back to public lawmaking 
procedures, commentators have posited certain alternative bases of 
legitimacy. These include expertise, transparency, notice, and opportunity 
for voice and exit. 238 Although it is presumed that a typical municipal 
ordinance adoption process is legitimate, in the context of adoption of 
LEED standards, the content of the ordinance at issue have not been 
promulgated by the governmental body; rather, they have been created by a 
non-state body.239 Therefore, because the USGBC' s administrative 
processes cannot be traced to a governmental process, we must consider 
. f 1 . . 240the su bstltutes or egttlmacy. 
2. Local Processes Are More Legitimate Than National Processes­
Notice, Incentive, and Voice 
In addition to producing a system that is more certain to address local 
externalities, a locally-created green building regulatory scheme is more 
likely to allow for citizen participation than a nationally promulgated 
scheme. At the most basic level, this is because citizens are often provided 
with greater notice of local actions,241 and have a greater incentive and 
opportunity to voice their opinions at city council and planning 
237 . Meidinger, supra note 207, at 81. Of course, if one believes in public choice theory, then 
this is not necessarily true, because governmental decisions may simply reflect the private, special 
interests that dominate the local political process. Indeed, my proposal may only guarantee a 
formally legitimate process. However, a public, governmental process at least provides for the 
possibility that special interests other than builders will organize to make their voices heard. For 
example, because the USGBC is dominated by building industry interests, it is unlikely that 
organized environmentalists have substantial input in the LEED promulgation process. In contrast, 
a public process gives those environmentalists an opportunity to counter the builders in a public 
hearing, and perhaps gain the ear of their local elected officials. 
238. Bodansky, supra note 13 7 , at 7 15. 
239. There is no evidence that the LEED standards have been thoroughly reviewed and vetted 
just because they have been incorporated by reference into a local government's code through a 
public lawmaking process. Indeed, city staff typically proposes the text of an ordinance for 
adoption, and city governmental entity will vote that ordinance up or down. This is especially 
concerning in a Scenario 3 or 6 jurisdiction. 
240. One may query whether legitimacy is even important in this scenario. Typically, 
legitimacy is important to those who are being regulated; they will be more likely to comply with 
laws that they believe to have been reached through a legitimate process. See,e.g., Richard Parker, 
The Use andAbuse ofTrade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What We Can Learn From 
the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT'L ENV1L L. REv. 1, 75 (1999). Here, however, building 
industry insiders should feel more comfortable complying with standards created by their brethren 
(whether or not those processes were inherently legitimate) than with regulations created and 
enforced solely by a government entity, albeit a legitimate one. 
241. For example, many zoning and planning codes require notice ofpublic hearings that will 
affect a particular parcel of land to be mailed to that parcel's owner. The same canno t be said of 
national-level environmental rulemaking activities. 
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commission hearings or local meetings of private organizations, than they 
would at a national-level hearing or organizational meeting. 242 
On the public front, the adoption of a municipal law typically follows a 
predictable, legitimate public process. First, city staff develops and 
recommends a municipal law for adoption. The city then holds a publicly 
noticed hearing where citizens are given an opportunity to comment on the 
merits of the proposal. Before the proposed law can become part of a city's 
code, the local elected governing body, such as a Board of Supervisors or 
Commissioners, as well as the Mayor, must vote to approve it (as an 
ordinance or resolution). Those officials often consider public comments 
and make proposed changes to staffs suggested law in response to the 
comments. The creation and approval of a green building ordinance that 
was proposed in a Scenario 1 jurisdiction, which provides legitimate 
process, would follow this typical structure. 
If a municipality were to use LEED as the base of its local ordinance 
and then add its own localized modifications (Scenario 2), members ofthe 
public who may be impacted by those standards- not only developers, but 
also community members and environmentalists-would still have an 
opportunity to comment on the contents of the ordinance, and thus have a 
voice in the final product.243 Therefore, this locally-adopted Scenario 2 
method also affords legitimate process. 244 
Thus, in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 jurisdictions, citizens have an 
opportunity to affect the content ofthe green building ordinance standards. 
Such voice imparts legitimacy to the process. Further, if residents disagree 
with policies or laws that are passed and approved by the city's 
government, they have an additional opportunity for voice and exit: they 
242. It is also typically easier to reach a decision or get ordinances passed at local, rather than 
national levels, because less consensus is required. Compare, e.g., BoARD OF SUPERVISORS, CITY 
AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, RUlES OF ORDER§ 2.16 (2007), ("(T]he favorable vote of six of 
the eleven Supervisors is required to approve ordinances .... Ordinances require consideration at 
two separate meetings with at least five days intervening, a first reading and a final passage."), 
available at http: //www. sfbos. org/Modules/ShowDocument aspx?documentid=34253 with ROBERT 
B. Do vE, ENACIMENTOFALAW, http: //thomas.loc.gov/home/enactment/enactlaw.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2010) (briefly, bills in United States Congress originate in one chamber, are referred to 
committee and subject to amendment and change, then put to vote before the entire chamber and 
subject to amendment once again, and upon favorable passage are sent to the other chamber where 
the pro cess repeats itself). See also Schoolhouse Rock, I'm Just a Bill, 
http: //www. schoolhouserock. tv/Bill.html (last visited Jan. 24, 201 0) (describing legislative process 
from perspective of cartoon "Bill"). 
243. Indeed, local decision-makers have more of an incentive to listen to their constituents 
than do national governments or agencies, because those constituencies are smaller and more able 
to act out against decisions with which they disagree. 
244. The same legitimate process would be present in the promulgation and adoption of a 
Scenario 5 ordinance. However, because it would be enforced by the promulgating entity, it would 
lose some element of legitimacy. 
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may vote the officials who passed the ordinance out of office.245 Ifthey are 
unsuccessful in doing so, there remains an extreme form of exit, in that 
they can move to a different jurisdiction with policies more suited to 
them. 246 
In contrast, if the government is contemplating a Scenario 3 or Scenario 
6 type of ordinance and will merely reference the LEED standards in its 
code without any changes or modifications, members of the local 
community will not have the opportunity to affect the content of the 
ordinance itself; the USGBC has already set the terms of LEED at a 
national level. Citizens will be able to speak at the public hearing on 
adoption of the ordinance itself, but they will only be able to offer "up or 
down" input, either asking the locality to approve the ordinance, with 
LEED as it is, or reject the ordinance outright. Although technically, 
individuals could have commented on the LEED standards via the 
USGBC's comment process, this is unrealistic. Average citizens and 
developers with no interest in green building likely had no notice of the 
LEED standards adoption process, and moreover had no incentive to voice 
their opinions about, for example, the promulgation of LEED Version 2.2, 
because at the time that it was published for comments, their cities had not 
yet considered adopting it. 
Further, in a Scenario 3 or Scenario 6 jurisdiction, even if local 
residents complain to their elected officials that they disagree with certain 
elements of the LEED requirements, those city officials are powerless to 
change the underlying LEED standards. 247 Indeed, the average citizen­
especially one who is not a member of the USGBC-cannot avail herself 
ofa democratic process to vote out the USGBC committee members if she 
disagrees with new LEED requirements. 248 This lack of voice is 
particularly problematic in this context when there is no real possibility of 
exit. Therefore, Scenario 3 and Scenario 6 ordinances, which rely on 
national promulgation of the LEED standard by the USGBC, fail to 
achieve the regime goal of legitimate process. In contrast, Scenario 1 and 
Scenario 2 ordinances, which rely on a local process, meet that goal. 
To summarize, depending on the ordinance scenario utilized, different 
245. Local governments also must provide notice of all public meetings. and many actually 
mail notices about meetings to property owners whose property will be directly impacted by a 
matter to be addressed at a given meeting. In contrast. though the U SGBC posts notice of its 
proposed new standards on its website for public comment, an average citizen would have no 
knowledge of the USGBC comment process, nor reason to look into it. 
246. This drastic form of exit would also be present if a city adopted the LEED standards, 
unless LEED s tandards are adopted universally. 
247 . Of course, the city officials can always pass a new ordinance that does not expressly rely 
on LEED. My point here is that they will not be able to reach into the USGBC' s process and alter 
the terms of the LEED standards themselves. 
248. Even LEED members lack a voice in attempting to remove the appointed USGBC 
committee members. 
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levels of legitimate process are present. A Scenario 1 jurisdiction, where 
the local government promulgates and enforces the standards it imposes on 
private developers, is the most protective of democracy and the rights of 
local citizens. Such a jurisdiction would not have any of the legitimacy 
problems addressed in this Part. Similarly, green building ordinances in a 
Scenario 2 or Scenario 5 jurisdiction allow for more process than do those 
in a Scenario 3 or Scenario 6locale. The reason for this is that in Scenarios 
2 and 5, the local government actually had to review the details of the 
LEED standards, determine that they were suitable for the city (perhaps 
even modifying them slightly, allowing citizens to affect their content), and 
then adopt them through the normal public lawmaking process, affording 
opportunity for public comment at a public hearing. Although members of 
the community might not agree with the content of the green building 
ordinance, they could not deny the ordinance's legitimacy, because it was 
"duly enacted by a democratically elected legislature. "249 Finally, a 
Scenario 3 or Scenario 6 jurisdiction, especially one with a 3b or 6b 
mutable import ordinance, is the least protective oflegitimate ~rocess and 
provides for the least amount of notice, incentive, and voice. 50 In these 
ordinances, no evidence exists that the local governments actually worked 
through the details of the standards, deciding instead to just refer to them in 
their codes. This is pure delegation of standard-making authority to the 
private promulgating entity and imparts no legitimacy to the process. 251 
Encouraging local governments to design their own green building 
regimes, which take into account their own localities' concerns and desires, 
will help to achieve the regime goal of legitimate process, resulting in 
greater public notice, incentive to participate, and voice. 
3. Public Processes Are More Legitimate than Private Processes 
a. Transparency 
While the USG BC has attempted to make the LEED processes for 
promulgating standards somewhat open, there are no requirements that it 
do so. On the other hand, public agencies and state actors252 are subject to 
249. Bodansky, supra note 13 7 , at 708 (emphasis added). 
250. Certainly, Scenarios 1 through 3 are more protective of democracy than are Scenarios 5 
and 6, which do n o t even require public compliance determinations. 
251. Indeed, Scenarios 3b and 6b are less legitimate, and afford less participation, than 3a or 
6a, because in the mutable reference scenarios, rulemaking authority has been completely delegated 
to the private entity; they city need not necessarily even be aware when a new version of the LEED 
standard is approved and operational. 
252. It is beyond the scope of this Article to address the issue of whether the USGBC would be 
considered a state actor. However, an initial review of the literature suggests that, because there is 
limited to no government involvement in the USGBC" s actual development of standards and 
awarding of certification, it would not be considered a state actor. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The 
Contracting State, 28 FlA. ST. U. L. REv. 155, 158 (2000) ("[Regulatory contracts] depend heavily 
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open government and records requirements, such as the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) and local "sunshine ordinances." These rules 
require the production, upon request, of documents revealing public 
decision-making processes. 253 One commentator even refers to FOIA as a 
"formalization of the tradition of transparency in government." 254 These 
ordinances do not apply to private, non-state actors, and yet, with respect to 
LEED and the USGBC, the standards promulgated by those actors have 
become law. 255 
Scenario 1 ordinances would most effectively address these concerns, 
and even a Scenario 2 jurisdiction would be acceptable because the public 
process would inherently include an open discussion and possibility for 
modification of the content of the privately promulgated standards, thus 
d. h 2561en mg transparency to t e process. 
b. Notice, Incentive, and Opportunity for Voice 
For many of the same reasons that standards promulgated locally, 
instead of nationally, provide opportunities for notice, incentive, and 
voice,257 standards promulgated by public entities, more so than those 
promulgated by private entities, provide these same benefits. The public 
records acts, addressed above, provide those who may be affected by 
publicly developed ordinances with an opportunity to gain knowledge 
about the processes used to promulgate the regulations, and the 
requirement that public entities make decisions as part of an open public 
lawmaking process allows the opportunity for voice. Again, a Scenario 1 
jurisdiction would allow for both of these benefits to the greatest extent. 
Although the processes used to arrive at the text of the LEED standards 
within the context of the USGBC process do not sufficiently provide 
average citizens with notice, incentive, or voice, a Scenario 2 jurisdiction 
that publicly considers the content of those privately-created regulations 
prior to their adoption addresses some of these participation concerns. 
A salient analogy is that of the ISO 14000 series environmental 
on private actors that tend not to be bound by constitutional or administrative law constraints."' 
(citations omitted)). 
253. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l)(A); S.F. CAL, SUNSHINE ORDINANCE, 
art. III,§ 67 .2l(a) (2008). 
254. Brian J. Gorman, Biosecurity arui Secrecy Policy: Problems, Theory, and a Call for 
Executive Action, 2 ISJLP 53, 65 (2006). 
255. Lawrence, supra note 136, at 654. 
256. As an aside, performance-based standards tend to foster a more transparent process than 
prescriptive standards, because the goals that are to be achieved via performance standards are 
clearly set forth. In contrast, with a prescriptive standard, a developer may be told what material to 
use, but not why that material is superior to others, thus obscuring the true intent behind the 
standard. See AM. Soc'y OFMECH. ENGRS, PERFoRMANCE BASED CODESAND STANDARDS 1 (2004), 
available at http: / /cs tools. asme. org/csconnect/pdf/CommitteeFiles/13 525. pdf. 
257 . See supra Part VI.B.2. 
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management standards, which were developed by a group, like the 
USGBC, that "remains heavily influenced by the private sector. "258 
Although that group's scope of work has substantially expanded to 
encompass activities that may have significant societal impacts, there has 
not been a corresponding increase in the representation of public 
stakeholders. This fact has been the source of consternation to some 
government agencies and civil society groups who have expressed a 
preference for the development of public standards whenever practical and 
259f easi bl e. 
C. 	 A Final Process Concern: The Problem ofLEED as a Changing 
Standard 
The USGBC' s LEED standards are not static. Green building 
technology, as with all construction and architectural technology, is 
constantly evolving. As new methods of recycling, materials reuse, and 
energy conservation are developed, the design of green buildings will also 
change. In recognition of this, the USGBC did not create LEED to be a 
static system. LEED for New Construction began with Version 1.0, moved 
through Versions 2.0, 2.1, and 2.2, and now the next version ofLEED, 3.0, 
is online.260 While the USGBC's recognition of emerging technologies is 
important, many cities that have adopted LEED into their Codes have 
overlooked, or not yet addressed, this point. 
Municipalities appear to be taking two tracks when it comes to deciding 
which version of the LEED standards their green building ordinances will 
incorporate. Some are locking into place the version in effect when their 
green building statute was promulgated (the fixed reference, Scenarios 3a 
and 6a), 26 1 while others state that the version ofLEED in effect at the time 
of permit application controls (the mutable reference, Scenarios 3b and 
6b). 262 For example, the San Francisco green building ordinance (a 
258. Morrison & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 126, at 522. 
259. Morrison & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 126, at 522. 
260. See supra notes 88, 98. 
261. See, e.g. , S.F., CAL, BUilDING CODE ch. 13C, § 1304C.O (2007 ) ("Thefollowing green 
building requirements shall apply to all projects within the scope of this chapter. ... The applicable 
LEED® ... performance standards for any applications subject to this legislation, regardless of 
application dates, are: . LEED®-NC v2.2-LEED® for New Construction (July 2007 )."); 
MAYOR'S TASK FORCE REPORT, SAN FRANCISCO, supra note 6, at Executive Summary 2 
("Regardless of changes to the rating systems that occur after adoption of these recommendations, 
the rating systems in effect at the time of adoption of these recommendations should govern."). 
262. LIVERMORE, CAL, MUN. CODE § 15.7 6.030 (2007), available at 
http://www. codepublishing. com/ca/LivermorePDF/Livermorefullcode 1109. pdf("'LEEDTM rating 
system' means the most recent version of the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 
(LEEDTM ) Commercial Green Building System TM , or other related LEEDTM rating system, approved 
by the U.S. Green Building Council") (emphasis added); BABYLON, N.Y., C oDE§ 89-84 (2008), 
available athttp://www.ecode360.com/?custld=BA0924 ("The To wn of Babylon "hereby adopts, in 
principle, the [U SGBC' s] Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design for New 
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Scenario 3a ordinance) freezes LEED for New Construction Version 2.2 in 
its code. 263 In one respect, the approach taken by San Francisco lessens 
concerns of improper delegation, as it implies that (similar to a Scenario 2 
ordinance) the City reviewed the requirements of LEED Version 2.2, 
decided that they were satisfactory, and determined that they could be 
relied upon to ensure that projects built pursuant to those standards would 
help lessen impacts from climate change and improve local environmental 
concerns. 
However, there are also problems with this approach. For example, 
assume a developer applies for a building permit in a town that requires 
privately funded commercial buildings to obtain LEED Silver certification 
under Version 2.2, and does so while Version 2.2 is still in effect. Further 
assume that the developer then vested her right to construct the building, 
but for certain reasons has not been able to continue or complete full 
construction, and thus has not yet received a certificate of occupancy. In 
the meantime, assume that the USGBC moves to its newly revised 
standards, LEED Version 3.0. Depending on how long it takes the vested 
building to be constructed and how long the USGBC agrees to continue 
issuing certifications under the old Version 2.2, it is possible that the 
developer may no longer be able to obtain LEED Silver certification under 
Version 2.2, because the USGBC will have moved on to only offering 
certification for compliance with LEED Version 3.0.264 
Perhaps a more pressing concern is that the USGBC modifies its 
standards for a reason-typically to correct perceived problems with the 
existing system. LEED Version 3.0, for example, addresses some of the 
concerns raised in this article, including point weightings based on human 
health and environmental impacts, and introduces a regional component. 
By freezing in time an evolving standard, a city will miss out on positive 
new developments such as these. 265 Further, as technology in this area 
improves, it is likely that easier and more cost-efficient methods for 
dealing with energy consumption and green building construction will be 
developed. The frozen-in-time LEED-based ordinances adopted by cities 
will either have to be revised in the near future, or cities will be stuck with 
Construction (LEED-NC) Rating System, Version 2.2, and, further, automatically adopts any future 
versions promulgated by the USGBC."). 
263. S.F. , CAL., BUILDING CODE ch. 13C, § 1304C.O (2007) (effective Nov. 1, 2008). 
264. As of June 27 , 2009, all new projects registering for LEED Certification with the USGBC 
must do so pursuant to LEED v. 3.0, not v. 2.2. U SGBC, LEED V3 Rollout, 
https: //www. usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentiD=5176 (last visited Jan. 24, 20 10). 
265. Of course, a city that has adopted, for example, LEED v. 2.2 can always amend its 
ordinance to adopt LEED v. 3.0. However, this invites a host of problems, including projects 
rushing to get into the pipeline so that they can be included under the old standard (if it would be 
more advantageous), additional long and drawn out public hearing processes over adoption of the 
new version, and additional investment of staff time and resources to learn about a new system after 
having already become familiar with the prior version. 
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an outdated methodology. 266 
Other municipalities have opted to reference the current version of 
LEED in their codes, as well as future versions. 267 This Scenario3b and 6b 
approach is also problematic, especially from a legal perspective. Certain 
courts have found the adoption of future editions of codes to be an invalid 
delegation. 268 In State v. Crawford, the Kansas Supreme Court held that a 
statute requiring that "'all electric wiring ... be in accordance with the 
National Electrical Code' was void for uncertainty."269 Specifically, the 
court had concerns that a person trying to comply with that code would not 
know if the National Fire Protective Association, the private entity that 
promulgated the code, had reconvened and revised the code. 270 Such 
concerns, which were legitimate in 1919 when Crawford was decided, 271 
are somewhat obviated in this day and age, especially with respect to the 
USGBC's revisions to the LEED standards, which are easily available 
online. 272 However, the court's underlying delegation determination 
266. If the ordinances are added to the building code, instead of the planning or zoning code, 
they will be more difficult to revise. In many states, revising local building codes is notoriously 
difficult, and often requires approval from the state. 
267. See, e.g., BABYLON, N.Y., CODE § 89 -84 (2008) available at 
http://www.ecode360.com/?custid=BA0924; PASADENA, CAL, MUN. CODE,§ 14.90.030(I)(Green 
Building Practices, Definitions) (2008) ('"LEED's Green Building Rating System (Rating System)' 
means the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design Green Building Rating System 
approved by the United States Green Building Council (USGBC) andas that Rating System may be 
amended from time to time by the USGBC." (emphasis added)), available at 
http: I/library.m unicode. com/index. aspx?clien tiD= 16551 &stateiD=5&stateN ame=California. 
268. State v. Crawford, 177 P. 360,361 (Kan. 1919) (finding adoption offuture editions of 
codes an unlawful delegation of legislative authority); N. Lights Motel, Inc. v. Sweaney, 561 P.2d 
117 6, 1181 n.3 (Alaska 1977) (stating, without reaching the constitutional question of delegation, 
"[a]dopting a code written by a private national organization generally does not raise delegation of 
authority problems as long as the code, organization and edition are clearly specified, and no 
attempt is made to adopt future amendments" (emphasis added)). 
269. 177 P. at 361 (quoting the Fire Prevention Act). 
270. /d. ("[T]here is no official way, indeed no practical way , for the average property owner 
to know what these code rules are."). 
271. See id. at 360. 
272. See USGBC, LEED, http: //www.usgbc.org /DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageiD=51 (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2009) (providing an introduction to LEED, the next version of LEED, and other 
LEED information). More recently, a court found that adoption of future versions of the code via 
statute is not a violation. Indep. Electricians & Elec. Contractors' Ass' n v. N.J. Bd. of Exam' rs of 
Elec. Contractors, 256 A.2d 33, 42 (N.J. 1969). In Independent Electricians , the New Jersey 
Supreme Court considered a state statute that required performance of electrical construction in 
accordance with the standards of the National Electrical Code. !d. at 241--42. The court found that 
there was no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power where the National Electrical Code 
was the "standard accepted safety code in the electrical industry throughout the United States" and 
where the "procedures of adoption, review and revision reflect a national consensus of 
manufacturers, consumers, scientific, technical and professional organizations, and governmental 
agencies." !d. at 242. Thus, a town such as Babylon, New York that has adopted future versions of 
LEED into its municipal code could rely on similar arguments, noting that LEED has become the de 
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remains valid and applicable: 
If the Legislature desires to adopt a rule of the National 
Electrical Code as a law of this state, it should copy that rule, 
and give it a title and an enacting clause, and pass it through 
the Senate and the House of Representatives by a 
constitutional majority, and give the Governor a chance to 
approve or veto it, and then hand it over to the secretary of 
0C' bl' 273state 1or pu 1cat10n. 
The court is, in effect, suggesting a Scenario 2 regime. 
VII. CONCLUSION: So WHAT'S THE ALTERNATIVE? 
Private green building requirements that rely on LEED standards would 
seem to be, if nothing else, a positive first step toward alleviating local 
environmental problems as well as addressing broader climate change 
issues. The fact that cities are taking action at all shows that they take the 
environment seriously, and believe that it is the responsibility of all parties 
involved to improve it. However, the problem is that once a city has 
adopted a LEED-based private green building ordinance, it will believe it 
has sufficiently addressed its concerns, and move onto something else. 
Instead, cities must be ready, willing, and able to modify those ordinances 
as the market and technological advances lower the cost and availability of 
green building mechanisms, and as technical standards emerge that better 
match the environmental needs of particular localities. 274 The adoption of 
green building mandates is a nascent trend, though a snowballing one. 
Thus, there is still time to halt the spread of LEED-based ordinances, 
which promote inefficient results achieved through less-than-legitimate 
processes, and adopt a better type of ordinance. 
facto national standard for green building in local municipal codes, and its revisions are conducted 
through an open and collaborative process. 
273. Crawford, 177 P. at 361. Such an approach would be in line with Scenario 2 ordinances. 
Cf City of Syracuse v. Penny, 300 N.Y.S.2d 679, 683 , (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (holding there is no 
invalid delegation where city adopted the National Electrical Code and incorporated it into the 
city's ordinance as part of the Electric Code of the City of Syracuse). 
274. Local governments should consider the cautionary tale surrounding the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) adoption of industry standards. OSHA adopted a 
number of regulations that were created as national consensus standards by the American 
Conference of Governmental and Industrial Hygienists, a private industry organization. Shapiro, 
supra note 134, at 401. Those regulations stuck, and they are now too entrenched to be changed, 
though people now realize that the standards are weak. Specifically, workers are not substantially 
protected by the standards due to the fact that the industry that drafted them was reluctant to 
characterize certain substances as carcinogens (indeed, more reluctant than the governmental 
organization itself would have been). THOMAS 0. McGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WoRKERS AT 
RISK: THE FAilED PROMISE OF THE OcCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 283 
(1993 ). 
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This Article has argued that a local (not national) and public (not 
private) solution is needed to ensure the greatest benefits to the 
environment at the least cost to cities and developers. It has also addressed 
the infeasibility of expecting cities-especially small ones with little 
technical expertise or manpower-to develop their own green building 
ordinances from scratch. Because of this resource problem, it may not be 
possible to articulate a "best possible solution." It therefore makes sense 
for all localities who wish to create a green building ordinance to start with 
a basic structure, such as the LEED checklist or a similar system that has 
been created by another, perhaps more local, standard-making 
organization. 275 Then, by taking into account local conditions, such as 
Washington, D.C.'s poor river and air quality or Nevada's drought-like 
conditions and abundant sunlight, local governments, working with 
members oflocal universities,276 state energy departments, or even LEED 
Accredited Professionals, should determine which standards would most 
effectively alleviate their locality-specific problems. Local governments 
should also involve economists and modelers to determine whether the 
existing standards could be augmented to better to achieve their goals 
while still ensuring that projects could be feasibly constructed. Members of 
the environmental community should be involved too, along with those in 
the building indust!f', to ensure balance between concerns for externalities 
and internalities. 27 Once this basic structure is in operation, localities 
should continue to review new versions of existing standards as they are 
promulgated by private organizations to determine whether any of the 
changes could aid them in their local pursuit of a healthy environment and 
in combating climate change. 
A substantial problem with the LEED system is that the points are not 
weighted, and thus developers often go with the cheaper and easier points 
to achieve LEED certification, neglecting the more expensive yet 
environmentally beneficial options, such as those relating to energy 
27 5. Although this Article focuses on the USGBC' s LEED standards, because those are the 
most widely used, there are a number of other green building standards systems that have been 
promulgated, including Green Globes (owned and operated by the Green Building Initiative, 
another industry-based organization), Build it Green's GreenPoint Rated system, SBTool 07 (the 
software implementation of the Green Building Challenge assessment method), and the American 
Institute of Architects' sustainability position statement and 16-point criteria for ratings systems. 
276. For example, the University of Georgia School of Law has a land use clinic that helps 
local governments develop new land use ordinances. See University of Georgia, Land Use Clinic, 
http:/ /law. uga. edu!landuseclinic/index.htrnl (last visited Jan. 28, 2010 ). 
277 . Most of the larger cities that have implemented the LEED-based private green building 
ordinances first formed green building "task forces," comprising government, industry, and 
environmental interests. These task forces likely understood and discussed the problems and 
limitations of a LEED-based system, but wanted to take action quickly and begin moving forward 
with an ordinance. This does not mean that, were they to reexamine the issue, with the 
understanding that they wanted to go beyond LEED, that they could not do so in a mutually 
agreeable way. Telephone Interview with D. C. Neighborhood Planning Coordinator, supra note 45. 
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conservation. If localities decide to create their own green building 
ordinances, they should work with economists to conduct cost-benefit 
analyses and to prioritize concerns. For example, ifa locality has only infill 
spaces that are close to public transit available for construction, but the 
locality is drought-prone and water-conservation measures are a priority, it 
could either: (a) make water conservation measures a prerequisite to 
obtaining certification; or (b) weight the points available for water 
conservation more heavily than those for less pressing concerns, such as 
sustainable sites located close to public transportation. By making the 
available points align more closely with local environmental costs, 
developers will be able to conduct a true cost-benefit analysis. 
Finally, green building ordinances must also take into account that the 
greenest building is an existing building, something the current version of 
LEED fails to recognize. The energy and resources that go into demolition 
and new construction-even new green construction-far surpasses that 
involved in renovating existing or historic buildings. 
In sum, this Article shows the failings of a private green building 
ordinance that relies wholly on the USGBC's LEED standards. A green 
building regime should be designed to achieve two fundamental goals: (1) 
efficacy-considering costs but ensuring strong green building measures so 
as to combat global warming and reduce local environmental externalities 
caused by buildings; and (2) legitimate process-ensuring that the 
regulations implemented by local governments are subject to a process that 
is legitimate, through various degrees of transparency, notice, and 
opportunity for voice and exit. Finally, although private green building 
ordinances can result in real environmental benefits, the two stated regime 
goals will not be met if cities continue to rely only on unmodified LEED 
standards as the basis of their green building regulations. 
So which ofthe two buildings described at the beginning ofthis Article 
is greener? If we define green by a building's local externalities, certainly 
the older, existing building, which is located close to parks, downtown 
amenities, and transit, is greener. People who live and work in the building 
can make use of the public transit options, reducing their reliance on 
individual vehicles that consume fuel and release harmful emissions. 
Although its energy use and water consumption are not efficient, it is safe 
to say that over the building's lifetime those losses pale in comparison to 
the water and energy that would be required to demolish it and construct a 
new building-even a LEED-certified one. However, if a city relies on 
LEED standards, the new "energy-efficient" building, which consumed 
numerous natural resources and large amounts ofenergy in its construction 
and infrastructure needs, not to mention rezoned farmland to commercial 
" b "ld" ,278use, can be deemed a green m mg. 
278. While LEED points are available in the Sustainable Sites category for dense, infill 
development, such development is no t a prerequisite. The argument could be made that, if a 
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The choice between the two types of buildings is an important one that 
cities must address. So that their green building ordinances will in fact 
result in desired changes in the environment, cities must consider seriously 
what types of harms they are trying to alleviate and what type of 
development they want to promote. This may vary based on locality, but 
the answer is the key to shaping the look and feel of our future. 
building were not able to achieve many points under the Sustainable Sites category due to its non­
infilllocation, it would have to do more in the other categories to reach the requisite number of 
points for certification. Notably, however, even non-infill, greenfield development can receive up to 
eleven out of a possible fourteen points in the Sustainable Sites category. 
